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I. INTRODUCTION 
The profile of the Amel'ican woman has 
changed in many important ways in the last two 
decades. 1 Women have achieved increasing inde-
pendence and control over their own lives, in part 
• The authors are graduates of Rutgers University-
School of Law, New Jersey. 
1. For example, the percentage of women in the labor 
force has increased from 37.8% in 1960 to 52.3% in 1981. 
The percentage of women heading households in the United 
[Women'.~ Rights Lau; Reporter, Vo/11111e 7. N11111ber 3, Spring 1982] 
© 198,J by Wo111e11 '.~ Wghts Law Reporter. ll11tgers-The State University 
0085-826918010908 
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because of greater reproductive freedom. This 
freedom extends to choices concerning procre-
ation, abortion, sexuality and motherhood. 2 
An increased degree of control over their repro-
ductive capacity has allowed some women to cre-
ate an alternative approach to motherhood which 
is outside the traditional family sphere. It is possi-
ble for a woman to postpone motherhood until 
she is economically able to support and to raise a 
child without a marriage partner. 
An unmarried woman can become a parent in 
several ways. She can parent a child who is not 
biologically her own through adoption or foster 
care, or she can assume parenting responsibilities 
for someone else's child without a legal arrange-
ment. She can also become a single parent by 
conceiving a child through sexual intercourse or 
through artificial insemination,. If she has inter-
course, she can become pregnant with or without 
the knowledge of the father. If she artificially 
inseminates, she can do so with or without the 
knowledge of the donor. 
Artificial insemination by donor (AID) 3 is play-
ing an increasingly important role in providing 
options for the single woman in her reproductive 
choices. While the procedure is not new, 4 its use 
as a means of parenting for single women and 
lesbian couples is gaining popularity. 5 
States has risen from 9.3% in 1960 to 14.6% in 1980. The 
rate of single women over 18 years old has risen from 13. 7 % 
in 1970 to 17 % in 1980. The percentage of unmarried 
women giving birth to children has increased from 5.3% of 
all births in 1960 to 17.l % in 1979. The number of mothers 
in the labor force with children under six years old has 
increased from 4,500,000 in 1970 to 6,000,000 in 1980. 
There has also been an increase in the use of contraceptives 
by women and an increase in the number of abortions. The 
abortion rate per 1,000 women has increased by 50 percent 
in the five years between 1972 and 1977. UNITED STATES 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (102d ed. 1981). 
2. See BosTON WoMEN's HEALTH BooK COLLECTIVE, 
OuR BODIES, OURSELVES (2d rev. ed. 1979). 
3. Artificial insemination permits fertilization of the 
embryo without sexual intercourse. Semen from a donor is 
inserted into a woman's vagina with the use of a syringe. 
4. The earliest artificial insemination in humans was per-
formed in 1790 by John Hunter, a Scottish surgeon. The first 
reported successful human insemination in the United States 
was performed by Dr. J. Marion Sims in 1866. The proce-
dure became generally accepted between 1920 and 1930. 
Callin & Newman, Whose Child is This?, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS 
14 (1979). 
5. It has been estimated that 250,000 people in the 
United States alone have been conceived by artificial insemi-
nation. F. MIMS & M. SWENSON, SEXUALITY: A NuRSING 
PERSPECTIVE 192 (1980). See also LESBIAN HEALTH INFORMA-
This paper will focus on AID as a means of 
reproduction chosen by single women and will 
discuss the practical considerations and legal im-
plications of that choice. Because of the uncon-
ventional subject matter of this work, the authors 
have chosen to present our underlying premises at 
the outset. It is our belief that the understanding 
of controversial issues is fostered by an acknowl-
edgment of the values that support a particular 
position. 
Legal arguments supporting the right of a sin-
gle woman to be a single parent through AID are 
based upon what one scholarly article has called 
the "freedom of intimate association." 6 As used 
here, this freedom does not mean absolute license 
to do whatever one pleases. Rather, it is a recogni-
tion that such decisions as whether to relate sexu-
ally or platonically, to marry or to remain single, 
to give birth or to abort, involve serious moral 
responsibility that rests with the individual mak-
ing the choice. In a free society, one's moral judg-
ments are not to be predetermined by coercive 
forces of the state, but should be the expression of 
the religious beliefs or philosophical convictions 
unique to each person. Intimate associational 
choice is at the heart of the values represented by 
a pluralistic society, and is protected by the lib-
erty and equality guarantees of the United States 
Constitution. 
In the present context, freedom of intimate as-
sociation. renders unfair the suppression of one 
form of intimate association-that between the 
single mother and her child-in order to advance 
or preserve another more conventional form-
that between the mother, father and child. How-
ever desirable the idealized nuclear family is to 
the majority, promotion of this ideal constitutes 
an insufficient justification for the state's suppres-
sion of alternative forms of intimate association, 
absent some showing of independent harm result-
ing from these alternatives. 7 Restrictions imposed 
TION PROJECT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: AN ALTERNATIVE 
CONCEPTION, (1979) (available from Lesbian Health Infor-
mation Project, c/o San Francisco Women's Centers, 3543 
18th St., San Francisco, CA 94110); WoMAN CONTROLLED 
CONCEPTION (available from Union Wage, P.O. Box 40904, 
San Francisco, CA 94140); Stern, Lesbian Insemination, Co-
EvoLUTION Q. (Summer 1980). 
6. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 
YALE L. J. 624 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Karst]. 
7. See id. at 657-58. Karst argues, in the context of 
prohibitions on homosexual conduct, that there is no legiti-
macy in an effort by the state to advance one view of moral-
ity by preventing the expression of another view. 
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on the freedom of intimate association, whether 
through the imposition of burdens or the depriva-
tion of benefits, must be independently justified. 
The formal status of marriage is a key to the 
availability of benefits, such as access to profes-
sional AID facilities 8 and judicial enforcement of 
a mother's right to custody of the AID child 
against the claims of a semen donor. The follow-
ing discussion concerns whether deprivation of 
such benefits constitutes an infringement of single 
women's rights under the fourteenth amendment 
of the United States Constitution. 9 
In assessing whether a Constitutional violation 
exists, we will evaluate the justifications that can 
be advanced to support this deprivation of bene-
fits, such as the arguments that it is not in the 
child's best interests to have been conceived 
through AID, that single parent families burden 
state resources and that the state may act to dis-
courage illegitimate births. An explanation of the 
methods of AID conception and the practical and 
legal concerns that influence a single woman's 
choice of a particular method precede our discus-
sion of the legal issues raised by AID. 
II. AID METHODS 
Artificial insemination can bt~ utilized by a sin-
gle woman in three ways. First, the prospective 
mother can be inseminated with the help of pro-
fessional services, either at a sperm bank or 
through an independent physician. 10 Second, she 
8. Doctors and clinics frequently follow a policy 
against providing AID for single women, see infra notes 21-
22, 48-52 and accompanying text. Furthermore, states tha't 
have statutes governing AID typically limit its administra-
tion to licensed doctors so that self-AID may constitute the 
unauthorized practice of medicine. Shaman, Legal Aspects 
of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331, 346-47 (1979-
80). 
9. This paper is not intended to be an exhaustive analy-
sis of how the law affects the single woman who decides to 
bear and raise a child conceived through AID. Rather, it is 
confined to an examination of the protections offered such a 
woman by the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The first amendment and arguments concern-
ing the freedom of expression are relevant to this issue and 
deserving of separate discussion. It is also possible that rele-
vant constitutional and statutory provisions exist in each 
state which could serve as a basis for additional protections. 
Furthermore, issues of reproductive freedom can potentially 
be argued on the basis of federal statutes and on the United 
States Constitution's thirteenth amendment prohibition 
against involuntary servitude. 
10. Her marital status may preclude her from choosing 
this method. See infra notes 21-22, 48-52 and accompanying 
text. 
can conceive through AID outside of a profes-
sional arrangement. That is, she can solicit the 
help of a third party liaison or go-between who 
selects the donor for her and arranges the insemi-
nation. The go-between carries the sperm from 
the donor to the prospective mother without dis-
closing the identity of either party to the other. 
Finally, she may choose to inseminate without 
anonymity and may work out the arrangements 
directly with the donor. Each of these methods 
involves practical considerations and raises differ-
ent concerns for the prospective AID mother. 
A. AID with an Unknown Donor Through a 
Sperm Bank or Private Physician 
For a woman intent on sole legal custody of her 
child, the major benefit of artificially inseminat-
ing through a sperm bank or through a private 
physician is the minimal risk of a future legal suit 
by the donor for custody or visitation. Our search 
did not uncover a single suit initiated by a donor 
against a woman who had conceived through a 
professional service. Likewise, there is no record 
of a suit by a mother against either a sperm bank 
or a physician-screened donor, or by an AID child 
against a donor for parental support obligations. 
To insure a continuous donor pool, doctors 
must guarantee that a donor's identity will never 
be disclosed. In a 1979 survey of doctors "".ho 
perform AID, 11 anonymity of the donor was 
found to be of paramount concern. The survey 
shows that secrecy is deemed important to protect 
the donor from legal involvement. 12 To guarantee 
anonymity, physicians often intentionally keep in-
adequate records or inseminate patients with mul-
tiple donors in a single cycle, making the identity 
of the genetic father uncertain. 13 Physicians jus-
tify these practices in light of recent court orders 
to open the records of adoption agencies. 14 
While these practices are primarily designed to 
protect the anonymity of a sperm donor, they also 
minimize the legal risks taken by a donee. 15 One 
drawback of this method is that the control of the 
11. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practices 
of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Curie-
Cohen survey]. 
12. Id. at 589. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. See infra text accompanying note 29. 
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selection of donors remains in the hands of the 
professionals involved. Of the 471 doctors sur-
veyed, 91.8 % do not allow recipients to select 
their own donors, and the remaining 8.2% con-
sider input from recipients only rarely. 16 Of the 
doctors surveyed, "(62 per cent) used medical stu-
dents or hospital residents; 10.5 per cent used 
other university or graduate students and 17.8 per 
cent used both [as donors]." 17 The remaining doc-
tors in the survey "obtained donors from military 
academies, husbands of obstetric patients, hospi-
tal personnel and friends of the physician." 18 
Although possession of certain genetically trans-
mitted traits would justify rejection of potential 
donors, the medical screenings reportedly done by 
the doctors in this survey are superficial at best. 
While most doctors do take medical histories of 
the donors, the questioning is most often limited 
to a report of genetic diseases existing in the fam-
ily of the donor or the use of a short checklist of 
common familial diseases. 19 Since the information 
is obtained by questioning the donor, its accuracy 
depends upon the donor's knowledge and opinions 
of what constitutes inheritable disorders. The sur-
vey reveals that a number of doctors expect medi-
cal students and hospital residents to screen them-
selves prior to donating and noted that donors 
who are financially motivated to donate may be 
less than reliable. 20 
Gaining access to professional facilities is a ma-
jor problem for the single woman wishing to se-
lect a professional AID procedure. The great ma-
jority of women currently served by sperm banks 
and private physicians are married. It was re-
ported in the Curie-Cohen survey that only 9.5 % 
of the women inseminated by doctors were with-
out a male partner. 21 
There is at least one case challenging the policy 
of a clinic that refused to accept an application 
from a woman because she was single. 22 The Mott 
16. Curie-Cohen survey, supra note 11, at 586. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 588. Doctors reported that donors are gener-
ally paid between $20.00 and $100.00 per ejaculation. "Al-
most half the doctors (45. 7 per cent) paid $25.00 per ejacula-
tion .... " Id. at 587. 
21. Id. at 585. 
22. Although the case was not fully considered by the 
court, the plaintiff prepared a brief outlining the constitu-
tional arguments supporting her position. Because the clinic 
is operated by Wayne State University and is funded in large 
Clinic in Michigan, a division of Wayne State 
University, had a policy which systematically de-
nied unmarried women the right to apply for AID 
services. With the assistance of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), the applicant initiated a 
suit challenging this discrimination by the sperm 
bank but the clinic abandoned its policy and ac-
cepted her application before the case reached a 
resolution by the courts. It is unclear how the 
court would have ruled had the case been fully 
litigated. Requiring the doors of AID facilities to 
be opened to single women is an affirmative act of 
enforcement. For reasons to be discussed, the 
courts may be unwilling to do more than passively 
ignore the fact that many single women will con-
ceive through non-professional methods. If courts 
decline to act, single women or lesbian couples 
part by the State of Michigan, there is state action and state 
support of the clinic's policy. The plaintiff argued that the 
policy interferes with her fundamental right to procreate, 
bear and raise a child. The plaintiff further argued that 
these fundamental rights are guaranteed by the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. She relied on Supreme 
Court decisions finding fundamental rights in marriage and 
procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 
(1942) and related rights to contraception, Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); family relationships, Prince 
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); child rearing 
and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 
(1925) and the decision whether or not to terminate a preg-
nancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 
410 U.S. 179 (1973). The plaintiff also argued that the policy 
interferes with her personal right because AID is the only 
acceptable means for her to have a child. She pointed to the 
fact that while single parent adoption is acceptable to the 
state, there is a preference by adoption agencies for two 
parent families and the chances for actual adoption are mini-
mal. She also argued that to compel her to engage in sexual 
intercourse would be a clear violation of her personal pri-
vacy and that if she were to conceive, the legal rights given 
to a putative father would interfere with her fundamental 
right to raise her child. She would be faced with the same 
interference if she were to conceive by artificially inseminat-
ing with a known donor, C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 
377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977) (for further 
discussion of C.M. v. C.C., see Part IV, Section B, infra). 
The plaintiff also challenged the marriage requirement be-
cause it is overly broad and creates an irrebuttable presump-
tion that all unmarried women are unfit to be mothers. In 
addition to the due process argument, the plaintiff claimed 
an equal protection violation since the policy discriminates 
without a compelling state interest. She addressed the most 
likely state argument that there is a legitimate societal inter-
est in the welfare of children born through AID. The plain-
tiff pointed to Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), a 
Supreme Court decision stating that the question of whether 
or not to have a child is a matter of personal conscience and 
a woman is free "to bring the child into life to suffer the 
myriad social, if not economic disabilities that the status of 
illegitimacy brings .... " Id. at 386. 
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may still be denied access to AID through a pro-
fessional service. 
B. AID with the Help of a Go-between 
A second method of artificially inseminating 
involves the help of a third party go-between. An 
arrangement is made between the woman seeking 
AID and another person who chooses the donor, 
negotiates the arrangements between the woman 
and the donor, and transports the sperm from the 
donor to the woman. There is no direct contact 
between the donor and the prospective mother. 
This necessarily requires that there be trust be-
tween the go-between and each of the parties 
involved. 
This method of AID promises more security 
from a possible legal suit than does the method 
involving a known donor, and the problems of 
accessibility to professional services are avoided. 
Nevertheless, when using a third party go-be-
tween instead of a professional service, this secur-
ity is reduced by the high risks of disclosure. Use 
of a go-between usually requires that the prospec-
tive mother and donor be in the same geographic 
area. Often they have ties to the same commu-
nity. This creates an increased possibility that an-
onymity will not be preserved. One can imagine 
how, in a small community, word might easily 
travel from one party to another. 23 There is also 
the possibility that the child will bear a physical 
similarity to the donor. In addition, the go-be-
tween may inadvertently mention one party's 
name to the other. All of these possibilities raise 
serious considerations for the participants. 24 
A safeguard that can be employed is to have the 
go-between gather sperm from several donors but 
give just one sample to the inseminating woman. 
This reduces the risk of disclosure because only the 
go-between knows who the actual donor is. How-
ever, this method also multiplies the logistical 
23. A donor's natural inclination to tell his friends that 
he is contributing to such a process can lead to an inadver-
tent co.mment to a friend of the woman receiving the sperm. 
!he fnend, who knows the woman is inseminating, is then 
m the position of either disclosing what s/he knows or of 
withholding important information from a friend. 
24. In one community, a situation did arise where the 
name of a donor was inadvertently mentioned to a friend of 
the prospective mother. In another situation, a go-between 
unintentionally mentioned the prospective mother's first 
name to her donor. Interview with anonymous Philadel-
phia, Pa. (Mar. 1981). ' 
problems because it requires arrangements and 
pick-ups from more than one donor. 
In addition to anonymity, this method of artifi-
cial insemination offers other advantages. Specifi-
cally, there is an opportunity for the prospective 
mother to have input into the choice of donor 
access to limited medical information about th; 
donor and access to paternal identity in the fu-
ture. Because the go-between is someone the 
woman knows and deals with directly, she can 
suggest certain traits she desires in a donor, such 
as race, physical characteristics, or ethnicity. If 
there is a special need for medical information in 
the future, the go-between can be asked to con-
tact the donor and request it. And, since access to 
paternal identity is likely to become important to 
the child in later life, some arrangements can be 
made, if all parties are agreeable, to permit dis-
closure of the donor's name at some set date. For 
example, the donor's name may be put into a 
safety deposit box to which the child can have 
access when s/he reaches a predetermined age. 
This maintains the minimal risk of a custody suit 
while the child is of minor age, yet later permits 
the child to learn the donor's identity. 
There are also difficulties with the method. 
First, a desirable go-between may be difficult to 
find. Being a go-between involves enormous re-
sponsibilities, as well as risks and frequent incon-
veniences. A person assuming this role must be 
absolutely committed to it. S/he must be a person 
with a certain amount of flexibility in her sched-
ule and a willingness to be available when 
needed. While a woman may be able to estimate 
the days in a month when she will be ovulating, 
she cannot control the timing .. When the woman 
is ovulating, the go-between must make arrang-
ments with the donor to have the sperm ready and 
must be available herself for pick-up and delivery. 
Inseminations are generally done two or three 
days during each cycle, and since it is estimated 
that women who become pregnant by AID are 
inseminated for an average of 3. 7 months these 
arrangements could become quite time consum-
ing. 2s 
Finally, there is the remote yet real possibility 
that the go-between will be put in a difficult legal 
situation. This could arise if either party decided 
25. See Curie-Cohen survey, supra note 11, at 587 (those 
who do not become pregnant generally discontinue the pro-
gram after approximately 6.4 months, id.). 
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to sue for disclosure. For example, if the mother 
decided to sue for support, she could bring the go-
between to court and the court could order disclo-
sure. The same could happen if the donor chose to 
sue for paternity rights. 26 These situations could 
force the go-between to choose between a con-
tempt of court charge for failure to reveal the 
name of the donor or donee, and the violation of a 
serious trust ifs/he did reveal the name(s). 
What rewards are there for the person who is 
the go-between? In a recent interview, a woman 
who has acted as a go-between said that her re-
ward is "the pleasure of knowing the woman and 
having contact with the child that is born." 27 
C. AID with a Known Donor 
Although AID with a known donor creates the 
greatest risk that the donor will subsequently 
claim legal rights to the child, many women are 
choosing this method. They are willing to accept 
this risk because this method of AID eliminates 
potential difficulties in gaining access to medical 
information, permits the prospective mother to 
make the choice of donor herself, and allows the 
child access to paternal roots. 
Once the donor is found, the logistics of the 
actual insemination are simple. The procedure 
can be done at home without professional assist-
ance. 
However, for legal reasons, a medical doctor 
may be asked to participate. Having a licensed 
physician involved in the insemination may be an 
asset to a mother's legal defense if the donor later 
sues for paternal rights. The Uniform Parentage 
Act includes a provision which says, in essence, 
that a donor of semen is not the legal father where 
that donor has given his sperm to a licensed physi-
cian for an insemination. 28 While this provision 
was probably designed to protect donors who pro-
vide semen to sperm banks or private physicians, 
26. Although there is not a case of this type known to the 
authors, this concern was expressed by a go-between and we 
believe it is worthy of mention. Interview with a go-be-
tween, Philadelphia, Pa. (Dec. 1980). 
27. Id. 
28. VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 5, 9A U.L.A. 592-93 (1979). 
One analysis of this section of the act states that "the purpose 
of this section is clearly to protect anonymous donors from 
legal responsibility for any children fathered by the use of 
their semen .... " Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 
CALIF. L. REV. 611, 614 (1978). 
it could also be raised by a mother seeking protec-
tion from a paternity suit by a donor. 
A second reason for inseminating with the help 
of a licensed physician is to demonstrate the intent 
of the parties. Donors who originally claimed they 
wanted no rights or responsibilities later have 
been known to demand the right to visitation. 29 If 
a custody suit were to arise between an AID 
mother and a donor, the court may view the ini-
tial expectations (or intent) of the parties as rele-
vant. 30 Having a medical professional perform the 
actual insemination may help to de-personalize 
the relationship between the parties as well as 
provide a credible witness who can attest to the 
fact that no paternal expectations existed at the 
time of insemination. 
Intent can also be documented by a written 
agreement between the prospective mother and 
donor in which they clearly state their expecta-
tions. While a written contract is not binding in a 
child custody suit, a court may consider it in de-
ciding a case. 31 One danger in having a signed 
agreement, however, is that it is evidence that the 
contesting donor is in fact the biological father of 
the child. A woman who conceives through AID 
may decide not to document the donor's paternity 
with a signed contract. 32 
In addition to the legal problems already men-
tioned, there is also the practical difficulty of 
finding a desirable donor who will agree to the 
arrangement desired by the prospective mother. A 
woman may want a donor to remain entirely re-
moved from the child during the early years, yet 
be willing to acknowledge his paternity when the 
child wants to know his/her paternal roots. Some 
women prefer that the donor always be known to 
the child but be treated more like a distant uncle 
29. HITCHENS, LESBIANS CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD: LEGAL 
ISSUES IN DONOR INSEMINATION 4 Qune 1981) (available from 
the Lesbian Rights Project, 1370 Mission St., 4th fl. San 
Francisco, CA 94103). 
30. In C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 
(Cumberland County Ct. 1977), the court granted parental 
rights to the donor after finding that the donor had "paternal 
expectations" at the time of the donation. The case was 
initiated by a known sperm donor against the single mother 
of an AID child. See infra Part IV, Section B, for further 
discussion of this case. 
31. See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 
A.2d 821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977); Commonwealth 
v. Viehdeffer, 235 Pa. Super. 477, 344 A.2d 613 (1975). See 
also infra note 35. 
32. Interview with lesbian couple, New York, N.Y. 
(Nov. 1979). 
(1982)] NOTE/AID 257 
than a father. Whatever the arrangement, it is 
essential for the donor to understand and accept 
his role in relation to the AID child. 
While it is difficult to find a desirable and will-
ing donor, it is not impossible. A more significant 
problem is that the donor may have stronger pa-
ternal feelings than expected. Even the most well-
intentioned donor may feel differently after the 
child is born and may decide to sue the mother for 
parental rights. This is a very serious risk, espe-
cially in light of the possibility that the courts will 
grant him those rights. 33 
III. CONCERNS OF THE SINGLE AID MOTHER 
The decision to inseminate by any of the meth-
ods mentioned above necessarily depends on the 
availability of the method. A woman's marital 
status and her sexual preference may preclude her 
access to a sperm bank or a private physician's 
help. If she would prefer the assistance of a go-
between, she must find someone who would be 
able and willing to accept this responsibility. 
Some of these obstacles are likely to be overcome 
if she elects to find and deal directly with a known 
donor. When the identity of the donor is known, 
however, other important factors must be consid-
ered. 
If the identity of each party is known to the 
other, there is an inherent risk to each. The moth-
er's concern is that the donor may one day sue her 
for custody of the child. The donor bears the risk 
that the mother will sue him for support. 34 Since 
contracts involving children are generally unen-
forceable35 the safest way to minimize these risks 
is to maintain an anonymous relationship. 
33. See C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 
(Cumberland County Ct. 1977). 
34. One man contemplating becoming a donor expressed 
his fear that the mother would one day abandon the child, 
leaving him with parental responsibility. Interview with a 
potential donor, Philadelphia, Pa. (Mar. 1981). 
35. Courts have generally held that contracts for the 
adoption of children in return for pecuniary consideration or 
for release from support obligations are void as contrary to 
public policy. See Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. 
L. REV. 611, 613 (1978). The policy being promoted is to 
protect children from being bought and sold as if they were 
chattel. While no case was uncovered involving a contract 
between a donor and an AID mother, it is doubtful that such 
an agreement would be enforced. 
One case that deviates from this trend is Reimche v. First 
Nat'! Bank of Nevada, 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975). In 
Reimche, the court of appeals uphe1d an agreement between 
the natural parents of an illegitimate child where the adop-
Anonymity, however, creates its own set of 
problems; for example, lack of access to medical 
information that the prospective mother would 
want to consider in choosing a donor and which 
later could be valuable in assessing the child's 
medical needs. Although sometimes it is possible 
to have the donor provide a medical profile that 
could be referred to if the need arises, it is proba-
bly impossible to include every potentially rele-
vant medical fact that may be needed. 36 A com-
plete medical profile by today's standards may not 
be adequate in future years. 
Anonymity also increases the risk of incest. This 
issue has been expressed as a serious concern in the 
context of adoption. Although it seems remote, 
"the spector of incest is real in traditional (secret) 
adoptions . . . . Intermarriage and incest can 
only be avoided with certainty when adoptees 
have the names of their natural parents." 37 The 
potential for incest is likely to be enhanced for the 
AID child since AID most often involves a donor 
located in the same geographic locale as the 
mother. 38 
tion by the father was in the best interests of the child and 
where pecuniary gain was not the motivating factor on the 
mother's part. The mother in that case relinquished the com-
panionship and affection of her child when she agreed to 
adoption by the father, promised not to regain legal custody, 
and promised to remain silent about parentage until the 
father's death. In exchange, the father agreed to care for and 
support the child and to leave the mother and child a share 
in his will upon his death. 
In upholding the agreement, the court distinguished the 
case on the grounds that it involved a family agreement. 
"The fears that approval of such a policy would lead to the 
bartering or sale of children are not borne out where we deal 
only with agreements between parents or close family mem-
bers." Id. at 190. (But see id. at 190, Koelsch, J., dissenting). 
See also Couch v. Couch, 35 Tenn. App. 464, 248 S.W.2d 
327 (1951); Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. 
REV. 611 (1978). 
36. According to Dr. Elizabeth Omand of the Adoption 
Forum of Philadelphia, this problem has also been encoun-
tered by adoptees, for whom medical information about the 
natural parents is similarly unavailable. Letter from Dr. 
Elizabeth Omand to Ms. Hilda Silverman of the American 
Civil Liberties Union in Philadelphia (Feb. 20, 1981). Ac-
cording to Dr. Omand, serious problems arise when medical 
information is obtained in advance of adoption. These prob-
lems result from incomplete medical forms and lack of 
knowledge of general family medical problems at the time of 
adoption. Id. 
37. Id. at 2. 
38. One lesbian couple living in New York City made 
arrangements through friends in California to inseminate 
using a donor from the West Coast. This arrangment mini-
mized contact between the donor and the lesbian family. 
However, the cost of air fare between the two cities makes 
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A woman choosing AID by anonymous donor 
must also consider the possibility that her child 
will later desire to know his or her biological fa-
ther. This psychological need to know one's bio-
logical roots has gained increased recognition in 
the context of adoption, and a growing number of 
adoptees are urging the courts to relax the closed 
record policies of adoption agencies. 39 
The single woman who chooses AID as a 
method of becoming a parent usually has two 
goals: (1) to conceive and bear a child, and (2) to 
raise her child without intervention by the semen 
donor (i.e., she wishes to raise the child either 
alone or in a household in which she and an adult 
(or adults) other than the donor serve as her 
child's nuclear family). The achievement of these 
goals represents the full realization of single par-
enthood. The remaining sections of this paper will 
examine the legal obstacles to their achievement. 
this option prohibitively expensive for most people. Inter-
view with lesbian couple, New York, N.Y. (Feb. 1981). 
39. Because of the similarities between an AID child and 
an adoptee (in both cases a birth parent might be living but 
absent), the authors talked to members of the Adoption Fo-
rum of Philadelphia about their experiences and about the 
importance they place on the child's right to know or have 
access to genetic roots. While that group is not a representa-
tive cross-section of all adoptees, their views do reflect what 
might be expected from at least some of the children born 
through AID where the donor is anonymous. 
It was the overwhelming consensus of the adoptees inter-
viewed that all people should have the right to know the 
identities of their birthparents. Lisa Segal, an adoptee and 
member of the Adoption Forum of Philadelphia, describes 
the issue as a matter of civil rights. In her view, "no one 
should have the power to keep the identity of a birthparent 
from you." She emphasized the need for an individual to 
know who his or her birthparent is, and said that having an 
actual relationship with the birthparent is less important. 
"For me, I didn't want or need to develop a relationship 
with my birthparent, but I really needed to meet and see 
her." 
Ms. Segal stated that, of the adopted people she knows, 
almost all believe it important to have access to parental 
identity. She said that she finds it "hard to understand how 
someone would not want to know .... I want that right 
and I want others to have that right." Furthermore, it 
should be noted that Ms. Segal has found and met her 
birthparents, and she describes the effect of this meeting as 
very positive. "Since then, I've been calmer, more self-as-
sured, more self-confident." Interview with Lisa Segal, 
member of the Adoption Forum of Philadelphia, (Nov. 
1981). See also Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional 
Right to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1200-
04 (1975); Comment, Adoptees' Equal Protection Rights, 28 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1314 (1981). 
40. See supra note 30. 
IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS 
The preceding discussion of the concerns of the 
prospective single AID mother and the options 
available to her highlight two barriers to full real-
ization of the right to be a single parent through 
AID. One barrier is the denial of equal access to 
AID facilities on the basis of marital status. The 
other is the common law precedent that grants 
paternity rights to a known semen donor on the 
basis of his professed parental expectation when 
the donee is single. 40 The first barrier arises from 
what appear to be, in many instances, the policies 
and actions of private institutions. The second 
barrier arises from the actions of the courts as they 
interpret and apply state and federal law to fam-
ily-related issues. The following discussion char-
acterizes each barrier as a form of state action 
which violates the Constitutionally guaranteed 
rights of individuals. 
The fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution is the basis of all federal Constitu-
tional claims challenging unwarranted discrimi-
nation and infringement of personal liberty by 
state authorities. The guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights, which protect citizens from the intrusions 
of federal authorities, restrict state action only to 
the extent permitted by the application of the 
fourteenth amendment. 41 Therefore, in the ab-
sence of state constitutional provisions and federal 
or state legislation guaranteeing additional rights 
to individuals, the fourteenth amendment is the 
only legal limitation on state action. 42 
The two safeguards of the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee of personal liberty and freedom 
from discrimination are the due process and equal 
protection clauses. 43 lri evaluating an equal pro-
41. The significance of the fourteenth amendment as a 
restraint on the states under the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses has developed gradually over the years since 
its ratification. The Supreme Court in Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), refused to characterize the four-
teenth amendment's guarantee of due process as an incorpo-
ration of the federal Bill of Rights. Subsequently, the Court 
selectively acknowledged certain privileges as fundamental 
to the concept of due process on the basis of the merits of the 
privileges themselves. 
42. This assertion is subject to the comments made supra 
note 9. 
43. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
(1982)] NOTE/AID 259 
tection claim, it is necessary to identify state 
action that establishes a classification which acts 
to deny certain individuals' rights and benefits 
while granting these rights to others. 44 A substan-
tive due process claim focuses on any deprivation 
by the state of certain protech~d personal interests 
regardless of whether a classification is involved. 45 
The due process clause and the equal protection 
clause are independent and distinct, but not mu-
tually exclusive guarantees of individual rights. 46 
The right to be a single parent through artifi-
cial insemination by donor involves both 1) the 
substantive due process guarantee of the funda-
mental right to conceive, bear and raise a child, 
and 2) the equal protection guarantee of freedom 
from discrimination on the basis of marital status. 
The two above-mentioned barriers to the right to 
be a single parent through AIU will be examined 
separately for specific infringements of the four-
teenth amendment's due process and equal pro-
tection clauses. 
A. Denial of Equal Access to AID Facilities 
1) State Action 
The fourteenth amendment protects citizens 
from governmental actions, but not from actions 
of private individuals or groups. Therefore, the 
actions of private entities must be linked to state 
action before the fourteenth amendment can be 
invoked. 47 
The circumstances in which the use of discrimi-
natory and wrongful policies by apparently pri-
vate groups become state action are determined 
by the particular facts of each case. 48 However, in 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the law. 
44. See Comment, Equal Protection and Due Process: 
Contrasting Methods of Review under Fourteenth Amend-
ment Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C:.L. L. REv. 529, 530 
(1979). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 531. 
47. Private conduct, "however discriminating and 
wrongful," cannot be challenged under the fourteenth 
amendment, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The 
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment are addressed to 
"actions of the political body denominated a State, by what-
ever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be 
taken." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880). 
48. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 
715 (1961) ("Only by sifting facts and weighing circum-
the context of privately operated AIU facilities, 
the relevant inquiry is the degree of interdepen-
dence and cooperation between the state and the 
AIU facilities that deny equal access to single 
women. In answering this inquiry it is important 
to investigate the extent of state funding received 
by the facility, 49 and the degree of state involve-
ment and participation in the actions of the pri-
vate entity. 50 An additional factor is whether the 
nature of the services provided are "affected with 
a public interest." 51 Finally, at least one Supreme 
Court decision suggests that the state must have 
been involved in making the particular decision 
being challenged in order for the state action re-
quirement to be met. 52 
The question of state action is thus essentially 
one of fact to be resolved on a case by case basis. 
State action may exist where the AID facility is 
located in a publicly owned building, receives 
substantial state funds, is guided in its operations 
by state regulations, is affiliated with a public 
entity (such as a University teaching hospital) and 
stances can the nonobvious involvment of the State in private 
conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at 772). 
49. See Simkens v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), 
where the court held that a private hospital which received a 
Hill-Burton grant was sufficiently involved with governmen-
tal action to be subject to the prohibitions under the fifth 
and fourteenth amendments against racial discrimination. 
50. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 
715 (1961). To find state action, the Court in Burton exam-
ined the activities, obligations, responsibilities and interde-
pendence of a state Parking Authority in relation to a private 
restaurant engaged in racial discrimination. The Court 
placed importance on the fact that the land and building in 
which the restaurant was located was publicly owned, the 
building was dedicated to public uses, and the upkeep, 
maintenance and costs of construction were all payable out 
of public funds. But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345 (1974) where Justice Rehnquist stated that the 
State of Pennsylvania was not sufficiently connected with 
the challenged termination of electric service to make the 
utility's conduct attributable to the State for purposes of the 
fourteenth amendment, where customer showed no more 
than that Metropolitan Edison was a heavily regulated pri-
vate utility with a partial monopoly and that it elected to 
terminate service in a manner that the Pennsylvania Utility 
Commission found permissible under State law. 
51. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (state 
action may be present in the exercise by a private entity of 
powers traditionally reserved to the state). But see Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 355 (1974), where 
the Court writes that this principle cannot be extended to 
include actions of regulated businesses, providing arguably 
essential goods and services affected with a public interest, 
without more. 
52. Id. 
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provides public services. But how much less than 
the aggregate of these factors would be sufficient 
for a showing of state action is difficult to deter-
mine on the basis of the cases decided thus far. 
2) Denial of a Fundamental Right 
Where state action is present in the denial of 
access to AID facilities to single women, it can be 
argued that the action effectively denies these 
women their fundamental right to procreate and 
their right to personal privacy. The Supreme 
Court expressly recognized a fundamental right to 
procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 53 As Justice 
Blackmun explained in Roe v. Wade, although 
the Constitution does not explicitly mention the 
right of privacy, the Supreme Court "has recog-
nized that a right of personal privacy, or a guar-
antee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does 
exist under the Constitution." 54 The opinion fur-
ther states "that only personal rights that can be 
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty' ... are included in this guar-
antee of personal privacy." 55 Furthermore, the 
Court in Roe v. Wade explains that this privacy 
right extends to certain activities relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, and childrearing and education. 56 
The Court's past and current characterization 
of the right of privacy as it relates to reproductive 
and childrearing decisions is crucial to an under-
standing of the protections afforded the single 
parent of an AID child. The privacy right was 
first endorsed by the majority of the United States 
Supreme Court as a constitutionally protected 
right in Griswold v. Connecticut. 57 In this case, 
53. See 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), where the right to 
procreate was first said by the Court to be "fundamental to 
the very existence and survival of the race." This right was 
not then characterized in terms of privacy. 
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 152 (1973). 
55. Id., quoting from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319 (1937). 
56. Id. at 152-53. The quotation in full is as follows: 
... the right (of personal privacy) has some extension 
to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42; id. at 460, 463-65 
(White, J., concurring in result); family relationships, 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321U.S.158, 166 (1944); and 
child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
supra. 
(parallel citations omitted). 
57. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
the court sought to protect the autonomy of the 
traditional family unit and held that the state 
could not prohibit the distribution of contracep-
tives to married couples. 58 
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, parental rights to 
direct the education of their children were upheld 
against state interference. 59 The plaintiffs in this 
case, a Catholic society operating parochial 
schools and a private military academy, brought 
suit to enjoin the enforcement of an Oregon stat-
ute requiring parents to send children between 
the ages of eight and sixteen to a public school. 
The Court found that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbring-
ing and education of children under their 
control . . . . The fundamental theory of 
liberty upon which all governments in this 
Union repose excludes any general power of 
the State to standardize its children by forc-
ing them to accept instruction from public 
teachers only. The child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coup-
led with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations. 60 
These early decisions involving the privacy 
right firmly establish its protection of the family's 
autonomy from the state in matters concerning 
the conception and rearing of children. 61 That is, 
the privacy right prevents the state from unneces-
sarily intruding upon the private relationships, 
and concerns of the family unit. 
58. The Court spoke of a concept of personal "liberty" of 
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause and of zones 
of privacy created by several constitutional guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights. On the basis of either analysis, the Court, 
speaking through Justice Douglas, made clear that states 
were to respect the privacy surrounding the marriage rela-
tionship. 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
Rights-older than our political parties, older than 
our school system. Marriage is a coming together for 
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate 
to the degree of being sacred. The association pro-
motes a way of life, not causes, a harmony in living, 
not political faiths, a bilateral loyalty, not commercial 
or social projects. 
Id. at 486. 
59. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
60. Id. at 534-35. 
61. See Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based The-
ory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Famil-
ial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 361 (1979) [herein-
after cited as Eichbaum]. 
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For the purposes of the pres£mt discussion, how-
ever, a right of privacy rooted in family-based 
values may not be adequate to protect a woman's 
decision to achieve single parenthood through 
AID. Although her decision to conceive, bear and 
raise a child is a private concern involving per-
sonal values, it must be recognized that she makes 
this decision as an unmarried woman. When a 
woman conceives a child without a male partner 
and raises this child in a non-traditional family 
arrangement, questions arise concerning the ex-
tent to which the Constitution protects such an 
alternative life style. Federal and state courts 
have only inconsistently acknowledged that it is 
irrational to make distinctions between legitimate 
and illegitimate children, 62 lesbian and heterosex-
ual parents in custody battles, 63 and single and 
married people in adoption proceedings. 64 
The protection of the reproductive choices of 
single women, because it involves considerations 
of the moral and social values held by the major-
ity of the public, must rely on broad interpreta-
tion of the privacy right. Such an interpretation 
upholds a right of privacy based upon principles 
of individual equality and autonomy. 65 That is, 
the privacy right protects the integrity of personal 
decisions concerning individual expression and de-
velopment. According to this viewpoint, the pro-
tection of a woman's decision to achieve single 
parenthood through AID is based, at least in part, 
on a right to personal autonomy in reproductive 
matters even when the manifestations of such au-
tonomy are contrary to social convention. 
Support for a broad interpretation of the pri-
vacy right can be found in cases relating to the 
reproductive decisions of single people. Eisenstadt 
62. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 
(1972). 
63. See LESBIAN MoTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN: AN AN-
NOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MATE-
RIALS, LESBIAN RIGHTS PROJECT, SAN FRANCISCO (D. Hitchens 
& A. Thomas eds. 1980), for a good comparison of diverse 
holdings on this issue. 
64. See, e.g., In re Joyce's Estate, 158 Me. 304, 183 A.2d 
513 (1962), where a single man living alone in his own home 
may constitute a family into which an illegitimate child may 
be adopted. But see In re Adoption i)f H., 69 Misc.2d 304, 
330 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Fam. Ct. 1972), where it was said that 
adoption by a single person is generally approved only in 
exceptional circumstances and in particular for the hard to 
place child for whom no desirable parental couple is avail-
able. 
65. See Eichbaum, supra note 61. 
v. Baird involved a challenge of state statutes that 
prohibited anyone other than a registered phar-
macist or physician from dispensing any article 
with the intention that it be used to prevent preg-
nancy. 66 Under this statutory scheme, married 
persons could obtain contraceptives to prevent 
pregnancy if they were obtained from doctors' or 
druggists' prescription. Single persons, however, 
could not obtain contraceptives from anyone to 
prevent pregnancy. In striking down these stat-
utes the Court observed: "If the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child." 67 
Less than a year later, in Roe v. Wade, the 
United States Supreme Court expanded the per-
sonal right of privacy to encompass any woman's 
decision whether to terminate her pregnancy. 68 At 
issue in that case were state statutes which made it 
a crime to " 'procure an abortion' ... or to at-
tempt one, except with respect to 'an abortion 
procured or attempted by medical advice for the 
purpose of saving the life of the mother.' " 69 The 
appellant, an unmarried and pregnant single 
woman who wished to terminate her pregnancy, 
contended that the statutes improperly invaded 
the right to choose not to bear a child. In holding 
the state statutes to be unconstitutional, the Court 
said that the right to terminate a pregnancy be-
longed to the individual "whether it be founded in 
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal 
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we 
feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in 
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to 
the people." 70 
In Eisenstadt and Roe the Court recognized the 
importance of freedom of individual choice where 
reproductive decisions are involved. Moreover, in 
Roe the personal right of privacy was held to 
protect the autonomy of the individual in a situa-
66. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
67. Id. at 453. 
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
69. Id. at 117-118. 
70. Id. at 153. The ninth amendment reads: "The enu-
meration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple." 
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tion involving social censorship of that individ-
ual's choice. 71 
In Carey v. Population Services International, 
the Court again acknowledged the importance of 
personal freedom in reproductive decisions. 72 The 
Court affirmed the decision by the district court 
which found unconstitutional a statute regulating 
the distribution of non-prescription contracep-
tives to minors: "Read in light of its progeny, the 
teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution pro-
tects individual decisions in matters of childbear-
ing from unjust intrusion by the state. " 73 
Examination of these United States Supreme 
Court decisions reveals a somewhat groping his-
torical development of the privacy right. There is 
uncertainty surrounding the proper characteriza-
tion of this right and the extent of the interests it 
protects. The Constitution does not explicitly 
mention any right of privacy, but it has been 
found to exist in the Constitution under various 
theories and labels. The Court in Roe v. Wade, 
looking back on the cumulative decisions it made 
concerning privacy interests in different contexts, 
presumably located the privacy right in the Con-
stitution's liberty guarantee. 74 
It is not necessary to pinpoint the particular 
Constitutional source of privacy interests in order 
to identify those interests which are acknowl-
edged as protected under the Constitution. What 
is important is that rights relating to procreation, 
contraception, family relationships and child 
rearing have all been deemed "fundamental." 75 
Once deemed fundamental, the fourteenth 
amendment protects these rights through the due 
process clause. 76 
71. The Court in Roe refused to recognize any state 
interests that would justify the denial of the right to choose 
an abortion altogether. Only the woman, together with her 
responsible physician is in a position to consider the relevant 
factors of medical, economic and psychological harm of an 
unwanted pregnancy. However, important state interests 
are permitted to qualify this autonomous decision. These 
interests are the protection of the health of the pregnant 
woman and the protection of potential human life. Thus, for 
"the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its 
interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, 
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is 
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preser-
vation of the life or health of the mother." Id. at 164-65. 
72. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
73. Id. at 687. 
74. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
75. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. 
76. See Comment, Equal Protection and Due Process: 
Contrasting Methods of Review under Fourteenth Amend-
ment Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529 (1979). 
Careful identification of the basis of the privacy 
right under the Constitution becomes much more 
important, however, when predicting the likeli-
hood of the expansion of Constitutional protec-
tions to cover new situations. The single woman's 
right to be a single parent through AID involves 
both the right to bear a child and the right to rear 
a child wi~hout a male partner. The fundamental 
right to procreate and parent without a man has 
not been asserted by the United States Supreme 
Court. To expand the interpretation of the pri-
vacy right or librety interest to protect such a 
decision, the Supreme Court must go further than 
it has yet been willing to go to protect alternative 
life styles. A protection of alternative life styles 
flows more easily from a privacy right based on 
personal autonomy (such as that recognized in 
Eisenstadt and Roe 77 ) than from a privacy right 
rooted in a tradition of the nuclear family. 78 
The United States Supreme Court has not dem-
onstrated a willingness to find Constitutional pro-
tections of life styles disfavored by majority 
norms. There have, in fact, been several conspicu-
ous failures to expand the privacy right to protect 
nontraditional families. 
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Su-
preme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that pro-
hibited the occupancy of a dwelling by more than 
two unrelated persons as a "family" while permit-
ting occupancy by any number of persons related 
by blood, adoption, or marriage. 79 The plaintiffs 
included three of six unrelated college students 
who rented a house in the village. The plaintiffs 
contended that the ordinance violated fundamen-
tal rights of association, travel and privacy and 
was a violation of equal protection. 80 Justice 
Douglas asserted that the case involved no such 
rights and held that the legislation was rationally 
related to the permissible state objective of laying 
out "zones where family values, youth values, and 
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make 
the area a sanctuary for people." 81 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71. 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61. 
79. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
80. Id. at 7. 
81. Id. at 9. But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494 (1977), where the Court concluded that hous-
ing ordinance which limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to 
members of a single family deprived appellant of her liberty 
in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. The ordinance operated in such a manner that 
appellant's household, consisting of her son, two grandsons 
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In Doe v. Commonwealth 82 the Supreme Court 
affirmed without comment a judgment made by a 
three-judge District Court that a Virginia statute 
making sodomy a crime did not deprive adult 
males, engaging in regular homosexual relations 
consensually and in private, of their constitutional 
rights to due process, freedom of expression and 
privacy. The Supreme Court's affirmance thus 
left unchallenged the District Court's restrictive 
interpretation of the privacy right. 
In upholding t~e validity of the statute, the 
District Court relied upon the precedential value 
of Griswold v. Connecticut and several other 
cases discussed above. 83 The court noted that these 
precedents rest exclusively on the precept that the 
Constitution condemns state legislation that tres-
passes upon the private incidents of marriage, 
upon the sanctity of the home, or upon the nur-
ture of family life. According to the District Court 
majority, these are the only cCmcerns which have 
justified the nullification of shtte intrusion on the 
privacy right. 84 
The dissenting opinion in Doe found quite a 
different message in these precedents: 
The Supreme Court has consistently held 
that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment protects the right of in-
dividuals to make personal choices, unfet-
tered by arbitrary and purposeless restrairits, 
in the private matters of marriage and pro-
creation. Roe v. Wade; aci::ord Doe v. Bol-
ton. See also Griswold v. Connecticut 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
I view those cases as standi11g for the princi-
ple that every individual has a right to be 
free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into one's decisions on {>rivate matters of 
intimate concern. A mature individual's 
choice of an adult sexual partner, in the pri-
vacy of his or her own home, would appear 
and herself, did not qualify. The Court distinguished this 
case from Belle Terre because the Belle Terre ordinance 
affected only unrelated individuals whereas the East Cleve-
land ordinance selected certain cah~gories of relatives who 
may live together and declared thilt others may not. The 
East Cleveland ordinance thereby impermissibly chose "to 
regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply into 
the family itself." Id. at 498. 
82. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), afj'g 111em. 403 F. Supp. 1199 
(E.D. Va. 1975) (Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall and Jus-
tice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for 
oral argument). 
83. See 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
84. Id. at 1200. 
to me to be a decision of the utmost private 
and intimate concern. Private consensual sex 
acts between adults are matters, absent evi-
dence that they are harmful, in which the 
state has no legitimate interest. 
To say, as the majority does, that the right 
of privacy, which every citizen has, is lim-
ited to matters of marital, home or family 
life is unwarranted under the law. Such a 
contention places a distinction in marital-
nonmarital matters which is inconsistent 
with current Supreme Court opinions and is 
unsupportable. 85 
The reasoning in the Doe dissent is very similar 
to that expressed by the majority of the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey two years later in State v. 
Saunders. 86 In Saunders, the court struck down as 
violative of the state constitution a statute that 
criminalized fornication between consenting 
adults. 87 The court found that "as an official sanc-
tion of certain conceptions of desirable lifestyles, 
social mores or individualized beliefs, [the statute] 
is not an appropriate exercise of the police 
power." 88 In protecting the privacy right, 89 and 
the right to make personal decisions regarding 
intimate relationships, the court held that "the 
liberty which is the birthright of every individual 
suffers dearly when the State can so grossly in-
trude on personal autonomy." 90 
It is significant that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court clearly distinguished its refusal to condone 
certain kinds of behavior, such as fornication, 
from the necessity nevertheless to grant such be-
havior protection under the New Jersey Constitu-
85. Id. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting). 
86. 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977). 
87. In Saunders the decision was made under the state 
Constitution. The court declared that "the lack of con-
straints imposed by considerations of federalism permits this 
Court to demand stronger and more persuasive showings of a 
public interest in allowing the State to prohibit sexual prac-
tices than would be required by the United States Supreme 
Court." Id. at 217, 381 A.2d at 341. 
88. Id. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342. 
89. Id. at 213-14, 381 A.2d at 339: 
We conclude that the conduct statutorily defined as 
fornication involves, by its very nature, a fundamental 
personal choice. Thus, the statute infringes upon the 
right of privacy. Although persons may differ as to the 
propriety and morality of such conduct and while we 
certainly do not condone its particular manifestations 
in this case, such a decision is necessarily encompassed 
in the concept of personal autonomy which our Con-
stitution seeks to safeguard. 
90. Id. at 220, 381 A.2d at 343. 
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tion. 91 The court refused to use the state constitu-
tion as a means of imposing majoritarian values 
upon the individual in the guise of public interest. 
This restraint is also evident in two other recent 
New Jersey decisions, concerning euthanasia and 
involuntary sterilization, where the court favored 
fundamental personal privacy choices after 
weighing them in balance with legitimate state 
interests. 92 
'f.he Saunders court believed that its analysis of 
the .privacy right was consistent with United 
States Supreme Court decisions on privacy and 
procreative decision-making: 93 
[T)he Court in Carey and Wade under-
scored the inherently private nature of a per-
son's decision to bear or beget children. It 
would be rather anomalous if such a deci-
sion could be constitutionally protected 
while the more fundamental decision as to 
whether to engage in the conduct which is 
necessary prerequisite to child-bearing could 
be constitutionally prohibited. 94 
The Saunders opinion, by including activities 
that lead directly to conception within the pro-
tected right of procreative privacy, also appears to 
support the single woman's right to choose to con-
ceive through AID. The decision to utilize the 
AID method of conception is "at least as intimate 
and personal as those [considerations] which are 
involved in choosing whether to use contracep-
tives. "95 Perhaps_ if the United States Supreme 
91. Id. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342. 
92. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) where it was held that a person 
has a constitutional right to discontinue use of artificial life-
sustaining apparatus when the prognosis for returning to 
cognitive or sapient life is poor. In Quinlan, the patient's 
constitutional right of privacy outweighed the public interest 
in preserving her life and presented a compelling reason for 
judicial intervention. See also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 
A.2d 467 (1981). In that case, judicial intervention was held 
to be essential to protect the constitutional rights of a woman 
too mentally impaired to make a conscious c_hoice to be 
sterilized. "What is at stake is not simply a right to obtain 
contraception or to attempt procreation. Implicit in both 
these complementary liberties is the right to make a mean-
ingful choice between them." Id. at 250, 426 A.2d at 474. 
The court carefully pointed out that although judicial inter-
vention is never authorized to compel sterilization, it may be 
permissible in order to protect the best interests of the incom-
petent where requested by the parents and where certain 
procedural safeguards exist. 
93. Saunders, 75 N.J. at 214, 381 A.2d at 340. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
Court were faced with a case involving prohibi-
tions of heterosexual fornication rather than ho-
mosexuality, it too would extend the protections 
of the privacy right to such activities. This would 
admittedly be small comfort, however, to the pro-
spective lesbian AID mother. 
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court 
has not yet expanded the privacy right as far as 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey did in Saunders. 
Instead, the one principle that clearly emerges 
from Griswold and its progeny is that there is a 
right to choose to procreate through traditional 
sexual intercourse. To that extent that the single 
AID mother is comparable to a single woman 
who conceives a child through the sexual act, she 
is similarly protected by this case law. 
The fact that the AID mother's conception 
takes place without any heterosexual relationship, 
however, may support restrictions on the procre-
ative right if the following two factors are found 
to be significantly harmful to state interests. First, 
the unconventional nature of AID conception, as 
distinguished from conception by sexual inter-
course, may be found to make AID less deserving 
of protection than are other forms of "illicit sex." 
Second, the single AID mother has deliberately 
rather than accidentally chosen the course of par-
enthood without a male partner. These distinc-
tions between AID and conception by sexual in-
tercourse may be interpreted to justify state 
restrictions on the single woman's access to profes-
sional AID facilities. 
The use of AID as a method of conception does 
not involve sexual intercourse, and therefore is not 
subject to the legal proscriptions applicable to sex-
ual activity. The courts have refused to equate the 
use of AID with immoral sexual conduct, at least 
in those cases that sought to find married women 
who conceived their children through AID guilty 
of adultery. 96 While it is unsettled whether AID 
outside the context of marriage is somehow more 
"immoral" than AID by married women, there is 
no legal basis for asserting that single women who 
artificially inseminate are any more guilty of im-
96. See Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemina-
tion, 18 J. FAM. L. 331, 334-35 (1979-80). In most jurisdic-
tions AID is not considered adultery unless there has been 
actual sexual intercourse. Strong public policy in favor of 
legitimacy supports this position. See also In re Adoption of 
Anonymous, 74 Misc.2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Surr. Ct. 
1973); People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 
Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968). 
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moral conduct than women engaging in extra-
marital sex. 
Single AID mothers have planned their concep-
tion as a deliberate, considered event whereas 
other single women often become pregnant unin-
tentionally as a result of sernal intercourse. It 
follows, then, that the single woman's right to 
conceive and bear a child through AID is closely 
related to the right to rear a child without a male 
partner. To permit AID conception by single 
women is to permit planned single parent house-
holds. 
The planned nature of AID conception renders 
it a more preventable occurrence than concep-
tions resulting from non-marital sex. This is true 
at least in the context of restricting access to pro-
fessional AID facilities. Thus, to the extent that 
prevention of AID conception by single women 
serves important state interests, 97 denying access 
of single women to AID facilities could be justi-
fied. . 
In reality, however, barring access to AID fa-
cilities is an irrational means of achieving this 
state interest, since it would restrict single wom-
en's procreative choice while accomplishing no 
preventive purpose. Many women would still con-
ceive through AID with a known donor or with 
the assistance of a go-between. The simplicity of 
the method renders AID conception potentially as 
clandestine and unpreventable as premarital sex. 
Thus, the prevention of planned single parent 
households would not be achieved by restricting 
access to professional AID facilities. The use of 
other AID methods or sexual intercourse are possi-
ble alternatives for single women determined to 
have children. Limiting access to AID facilities 
only serves to subtract one particular method of 
AID conception from the choices available to sin-
gle women. 
The limited effectiveness of restricting access 
does not minimize the importance of professional 
AID facilities as an option desired by many single 
women. A single woman who conceives with the 
assistance of professional AID facilities benefits 
from a safe source of anonymous donors, and is 
most likely thereafter to experience single parent-
hood free from donor challenges. 98 For some 
women this is preferable to the risks and inherent 
97. See discussion of state interests, infra Part IV, Sec-
tion A(4). 
98. See supra Part II, Section A. 
difficulties of finding and screening potential 
known donors privately. 99 Professionally con-
ducted AID is also preferable for many other sin-
gle women who believe that sexual intercourse 
·with a man outside marriage, or solely for the 
purpose of conceiving a child, is not an alternative 
consistent with their personal values. 
Denying these single women equal access to 
AID facilities is a deprivation of their right to 
choose an appropriate method of conception. The 
question then becomes whether the deprivation of 
a choice of method effectively operates as a depri-
vation of the fundamental right to procreate. If 
so, the state must be prepared to justify this depri-
vation by demonstrating that compelling state in-
terests are thereby served. 100 
3) Denial of Access to AID Facilities on the Basis 
of Marital Status 
We have just considered arguments that could 
support a claim under the due process clause that 
the denial of equal access to AID facilities is an 
unconstitutional barrier to the exercise of a single 
woman's fundamental rights of procreation and 
privacy. These arguments also support a claim 
rooted in the equal protection clause. 101 As stated 
previously, an equal protection claim involves a 
classification which acts to deny certain individ-
uals rights and benefits while granting these rights 
to others. In the present context, the equal protec-
tion claim arises from the fact that some profes-
sional facilities and some state statutes discrimi-
nate on the basis of marital status. 102 Opening the 
doors to married women while closing them to 
single women is a scheme of distribution of bene-
fits that raises a claim under the equal protection 
clause. 
Critics of AID for single women may argue that 
the state has no affirmative duty to make avail-
99. See supra Part II, Section C. 
100. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
101. It should be mentioned that there is yet another 
means to attack the denial of equal access to AID facilities. 
This attack challenges the same conduct, i.e., discrimination 
on the basis of marital status, but characterizes it as a viola-
tion of due process. This argument is based on allegations 
that an institution's policy which denies single women access 
to AID is overly broad on its face and thereby creates an 
irrebuttable presumption of unfitness. This argument is not 
advanced in this paper because it is probably not the strong-
est means of attacking the policy. See infra text accompany-
ing note 105-06; see also supra note 22. 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 8. 
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able new methods of conception to those who are 
otherwise unable to conceive. That is not the issue 
before us, however. Here, states have elected to 
provide AID, but only as an option available to 
married women. Marital status is a classification 
used to control access to a particular means of 
procreation. 
In the preceding section we considered whether 
the fundamental right of procreation and privacy 
protects an unmarried woman's decision to con-
ceive through AID. When access to facilities is 
denied on the basis of marital status, the issue 
involved is whether the state may limit a single 
woman to conception through the sexual act or 
non-professional AID methods even when a pro-
fessional facility would be a more personally suit-
able alternative. 
4) State Interests 
A court will not necessarily protect a right sim-
ply because it has fourteenth amendment dimen-
sions. The determining inquiry is whether the 
state can justify the infringement of an individ-
ual's right by demonstrating a sufficient state in-
terest. 
Under some circumstances, a state can justify 
an infringement by demonstrating a rational basis 
for its action (rational basis analysis) .103 When a 
fundamental right or suspect class is involved, 
however, the state must demonstrate that the 
challenged action is necessary to promote a com-
pelling state interest (strict scrutiny analysis). 104 
103. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 
(1970); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. 
Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
104. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) 
(interstate travel); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 
U.S. 621 (1969) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969) (interstate travel). 
The reader may question the need to employ strict scru-
tiny analysis under the equal protection clause when the 
presence of a fundamental right already calls for such analy-
sis under the due process clause. We have argued that the 
limitation of any woman's right to artificially inseminate is 
an infringement of her fundamental right to privacy under 
the due process clause unless such limitation is necessary to 
promote a compelling or overriding state interest. A chal-
lenge to state regulation under the due process clause is most 
appropriate when the law limits the liberty of all persons to 
engage in some activity. An absolute denial by law of funda-
mental rights to everyone who could otherwise exercise these 
rights is rare, however. Rights are more often selectively 
denied to certain groups of people while other groups freely 
exercise these same rights. In the case of artificial insemina-
tion, single women are selected out of the general population 
of women and are subjected to greater restrictions. It is 
More specifically, the equal protection clause 
mandates that a classification be judged by the 
"standard of whether it promotes a compelling 
state interest" 105 when it either singles out a sus-
pect class for any reason or affects a non-suspect 
class' exercise of a fundamental right that is pro-
tected by the due process clause. Such a classifica-
tion "cannot be upheld unless it is supported by 
sufficiently important state interests and is closely 
tailored to effectuate those interests." 106 
A single woman's right to artificially insemi-
nate, when that right is freely exercised by mar-
ried women, involves the dual interests of both 
equal protection and due process. Although mari-
tal status is not a suspect class, artifical insemina-
tion, it has been argued above, is a fundamental 
right under the due process clause. State restric-
tions on a single woman's right to artificially in-
seminate thus affect a non-suspect class' exercise 
of a fundamental right and must be strictly scruti-
nized. 
In applying strict scrutiny to analyze state regu-
lations of artificial insemination, it is important to 
note that the rights of procreation and privacy are 
not absolute, even if fundamental. The Court's 
decisions recognizing these rights acknowledge 
that some state regulation in areas protected by 
that right is appropriate. In Roe v. Wade, for 
instance, the Court found that the state interests 
in the life and health of the mother and the un-
born fetus could justify narrowly drawn state reg-
ulation of a mother's right to an abortion during 
certain stages of her pregnancy. 107 
State policies which prevent a single woman 
from conceiving a child through artificial insemi-
therefore important to find an independent basis for invok-
ing strict scrutiny when challenging these greater restrictions 
as a violation of the equal protection clause. 
105. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The 
Court held that "even under traditional equal protection 
tests a classification of welfare applicants according to 
whether they have lived in the State for one year would seem 
irrational and unconstitutional. But, of course, the tradi-
tional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classifi-
cation here touches on the fundamental right of interstate 
movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the 
stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state 
interest. Under this standard, the waiting period require-
ment clearly violates the equal protection clause." Id. at 638. 
106. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). See 
also discussion of strict scrutiny analysis in Massachusetts Bd. 
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); 
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 
(1974). 
107. 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973). 
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nation will probably focus on the welfare of the 
AID child and of society as a whole for their 
justification. The state would rely on its recog-
nized interest in protecting the welfare of children 
to justify its interference with a single woman's 
fundamental right ot procreate. Therefore, the 
state is likely to make the following arguments: 
a) the child will suffer as a result of his or her 
legal or social status as illegitimate, and prospec-
tive parents of illegitimate children are therefore 
deserving of discriminatory treatment that will 
discourage them from procreating; b) the child 
will not be provided with suitable care or will be 
psychologically harmed by having one parent and 
by being denied contact with the biological father 
and paternal roots. Each argument will be ad-
dressed separately. 
a) Illegitimacy 
Historically, illegitimate children experienced 
both social and legal consequences as a result of 
their disfavored status as the products of illicit sex. 
During the last decade, however, the Supreme 
Court has found that the equal protection clause 
will not permit laws that discriminate against 
children on the basis of birth status. The Court's 
determination to prevent such discrimination has 
been evident in cases involving wrongful death 
statutes, child support statutes, workman's com-
pensation laws providing benefits to dependents, 
social security benefits, and statutes on intestate 
succession. 108 
108. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (intes-
tate inheritance cannot depend upon child's illegitimate sta-
tus); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (illegiti-
mate children entitled to same benefits from their parents' 
Social Security disability insurance as legitimate children); 
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (illegitimate children 
have same right to child support as do legitimate children); 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) 
(illegitimate children may recover in wrongful death action 
and workers' compensation claim arising from father's 
death); Levy v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate 
children have same right to bring wrongful death action as 
do legitimate children); Giana v. American Guar. and Liab. 
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (mother may recover for wrong-
ful death of illegitimate child). But see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 
U.S. 259 (1978). In Lalli, the Supreme Court found that a 
state's compelling interest in the orderly intestate descent of 
property justified a state statute that required illegitimate 
children to have a court declare paternity during the father's 
lifetime and within two years of the child's birth in order to 
inherit by intestate succession from their fathers. The court 
claimed that this statute, unlike that challenged in Trimble, 
was not based on the impermissible state goal of encouraging 
legitimate relationships by punishing the child. 
Legal classifications based on illegitimacy have 
not been struck down under the strict scrutiny 
standard of review. Instead, in these cases a lesser 
standard of review has evolved which is more 
demanding than the rational basis analysis but 
requires only that the statutory classification in 
question be substantially related to permissible 
state interests. 109 This intermediate standard of 
review has apparently been developed in an at-
tempt to protect innocent children from society's 
disapproval of the parents' illicit liaisons, while 
still deferring to the state's regulatory power in 
certain matters. 110 
While the Court has usually protected illegiti-
mate children, it has left unchallenged a state's 
inclination to discourage illegitimate relationships 
through regulation of adult behavior. Parham v. 
Hughes 111 is perhaps the best known Supreme 
Court decision upholding this type of state regula-
tion. In Parham, the Court affirmed a state's abil-
ity to single out illegitimate fathers for discrimina-
tory treatment because of the illegitimacy 
relation. In this case, the father of an illegitimate 
child was barred from bringing a wrongful death 
action after his child and the child's mother were 
killed in an auto accident. If the mother had not 
been killed she would have been entitled to dam-
ages for the wrongful death of her child. The 
father was denied this same right because he had 
not filed a petition in court to legitimate his son 
during the son's lifetime. 11 2 
It is important to note that the Parham decision 
cannot be explained as an effort by the Court to 
punish the father for irresponsible behavior. In 
this case, there was evidence that the father, as 
well as the mother, was involved in the upbring-
ing of the child. 113 The father had signed the 
child's birth certificate, had supported the child 
and had visited him regularly. The child had 
taken the father's name. What the father had 
failed to do was to take the unusually sophisti-
cated step of petitioning the court for legitima-
tion. 
It is not certain upon what basis the Court has 
distinguished between the need to protect the ille-
109. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265. 
110. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 
164, 175 (1972). 
111. 441 U.S. 347 (1979). 
112. Id. at 353-57. 
113. The father in Parham had unsuccessfully challenged 
the statute on the grounds of sex discrimination, id. 
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gitimate child and the validity of denying the 
parents certain benefits of the parent-child rela-
tionship when there is no formal marriage be-
tween mother and father. The innocence of the 
child and the guilt of the parent is involved, of 
course, but it should not be the state's responsibil-
ity to punish "sinful" associations unless there is a 
constitutionally sound, secular policy for doing so. 
One possible policy justification could be the 
state's interest in promoting the welfare of chil-
dren. That is, illegitimate births should be dis-
couraged because of the supposed social stigma 
that illegitimate children suffer. 
The fact of being differen-t in any way from 
their peers often causes children to suffer. There is 
therefore some truth to the expectation that chil-
dren born in this world without legitimate fathers 
are likely to feel stigmatized. Whether this is det-
rimental to the child's well-being, however, is 
likely to turn on other factors such as the love and 
support of the primary caretakers and the charac-
teristics of the child's peer group. 
Regardless of the strength of the social reproach 
experienced by the child, the Court has acknowl-
edged that while it can protect the individual 
from laws that discriminate, social stigma is an 
area beyond its control. 114 Furthermore, a woman 
is free "to bring the child into life to suffer the 
myriad social, if not economic, disabilities that 
the status of illegitimacy brings." 115 
Although the Court cannot protect the prospec-
tive children of illegitmate liaisons from society's 
disapproval, it may attempt to prevent illegitmate 
births resulting from AID conception by support-
ing state restrictions on access to AID facilities. 
The Court may presume a state duty to intervene 
to prevent the birth of an illegitimate child 
through AID which justifies state restrictions on 
the right of procreation prior to conception. 
At least when racial discrimination is the mo-
tive, a state cannot restrict a prospective parent's 
constitutional rights in order to avoid supposed 
harm to the offspring. In Loving v. Virginia, 116 
one of the state purposes advanced to justify a 
statute prohibiting a white person from marrying 
114. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 
164, 176 (1972), the Court stated that it is "powerless to 
prevent the social opprobrium suffered by illegitimate chil-
dren." 
115. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 377, 386 (1978). 
116. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
anyone other than another white person was to 
avoid the consequence of a "mongrel breed of 
citizens." 117 The Court found this unpersuasive 
and ruled that "[u]nder our Constitution, the 
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of an-
other race resides with the individual and cannot 
be impinged by the State." 118 
The Court's particularly strict enforcement of 
the fourteenth amendment in cases involving offi-
cial state sources of invidious discrimination ren-
ders the precedential value of Loving in cases in-
volving mothers of AID children doubtful. 
Perhaps a better analogy can be made to cases 
that deal with a state's power to regulate steriliza-
tion, since sterilization also involves intervention 
in procreative choice prior to conception. These 
cases are discussed in the following section. 119 
Another policy justification for state discour-
agement of the illegitimacy relation is the protec-
tion of legitimate status. This policy has been the 
guiding light to legal restrictions of illegitimacy in 
the past, when the law was applied to assure that 
a man's status and wealth would attach to a 
woman only when he chose to formalize the un-
ion, and would pass only to the children of such a 
formal union. 120 One can expect that this policy 
will be increasingly subject to challenge in a soci-
ety that emphasizes achievement and de-empha-
sizes ascription in awarding status, 121 that be-
comes more diverse in family organization such 
that women-headed households are secondary 
norms, 122 and as sex discrimination in statutes be-
comes more disfavored. 
Without substantial state interests to justify a 
policy of favoring legitimate associations by disfa-
voring alternative associations which nevertheless 
foster the nurturance and security of children, the 
regulations discouraging illegitimacy per se can-
not be constitutionally supported. Accordingly, 
equal access to AID facilities cannot be denied 
117. Id. at 6. 
118. Id. at 12. 
119. See infra Part IV, Section A(4)(b)(i). 
120. Karst, supra note 6, at 678, referring to F. POLLOCK 
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 376 (S. 
Milsom ed., 2d ed. 1968). 
121. Karst, supra note 6, at 677, referring to Coser & 
Coser, The Principle of Legitimacy and Its Patterned In-
fringement in Social Revolutions, in CROSS-NATIONAL FAM-
ILY RESEARCH 119 (M. Sussman & B. Cogwell eds. 1972). 
122. Karst, supra note 6, at 677, referring to Adams, An 
Inquiry into the Nature of the Family, in FAMILY IN TRANSI-
TION 72, 82 (1971). 
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single women solely on the basis of their marital 
status if the sole state interest is in preventing 
illegitimate births~ 
b) Harm to the Prospective Child and Burdens 
on State Resources 
Beyond the question of illegitimacy, the state 
may assert an interest in the future well-being of 
the prospective child, as well as an interest in 
avoiding the burden on society of single parent 
families. Two possible ways to analyze these state 
interests are by analogy to sterilization cases and 
by analogy to those cases where the courts have 
intervened to terminate parerl.tal rights. 
i) Sterilization 
In 1927, the United States Supreme Court up-
held a state statute which permitted the superin-
tendent of a mental institution to order the sterili-
zation of a patient if, in his opinion, it would be 
in the best interests of the patient and society to do 
so. 123 Since then the practice of sterilizing select 
members of society continues, although theories 
justifying this procedure are shifting. 124 
Sterilization cases provide a useful analogy be-
cause, as with legislation forbidding procreation 
for single women through use of professional AID 
facilities, the state is seeking to prevent concep-
tion. The state might argue, however, that less 
justification is needed for lt)gislation prohibiting 
AID since a fertile single woman has the capacity 
to procreate by other means, whereas sterilization 
is most often a permanent condition which abso-
lutely bars procreation. 125 Additionally, the bur-
den on the sterili~ed individual is greater since she 
must undergo a surgical procedure. 
It is conceded that the surgical, frequently per-
manent nature of sterilization makes this proce-
123. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
124. Most laws promote the sterilization of mentally ill 
people on the basis of eugenics. Recently, the notion that 
mental illness is an inheritable trait has come under attack. 
Perhaps for this reason, cases on the subject are now devel-
oping a theory of substituted consent, which is not based on 
the notion of protecting future generations but rather on the 
protection of the patient herself. Substituted consent is an 
exercise of state parens patriae power where the subject of 
the sterilization is not herself capable of consent. See, e.g., 
In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). 
125. There are some sterilization procedures performed 
on women which may be reversed; however, these proce-
dures are still in an experimental stage. E.S.E. HAFER, T.N. 
EVANS, HUMAN REPRODUCTION (1973). 
<lure physically more burdensome than is the de-
nial of access to AID facilities. However, a single 
woman's supposed capacity to procreate without 
AID is often a practical falsehood. The denial of 
access to AID for many single women has the 
profound effect on constitutiopal rights that 
courts have recognized in sterilization cases. This 
is because alternative methods of procreation are 
not realistic options for the woman who is chilled 
from exercising them because of fear of a pater-
nity suit, or for the woman who believes it im-
moral to have sexual intercourse with a man who 
is not her husband, or for a lesbian woman who 
does not relate sexually to men. For these women, 
denial of AID amounts to a denial of the funda-
mental right to procreate. 
State-ordered sterilization has generally been 
supported by three theories: 1) a state's right to 
protect itself from future generations of mentally 
disabled people; 126 2) a state's interest in protect-
ing the prospective child; 127 and 3) a state's duty 
to substitute consent for the woman not capable 
of giving her own consent. 128 Only the second of 
these is relevant to the analogy between steriliza-
tion and denial of access to AID facilities. 129 
The state's interest in the well-being of the pro-
spective child might be asserted in terms of the 
state's right to protect itself from the consequences 
of single women conceiving through AID and 
burdening state resources. The state might allege 
that denying single women access to AID would 
serve a legitimate state interest since unmarried 
mothers are likely to go on welfare and become an 
economic burden on the state. 13° Further, the 
state may argue that a child raised without a 
father will have emotional problems and will put 
a strain on already limited social services. The 
126. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
127. In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 
307 (1976). 
128. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). 
129. The state's right to protect itself from future genera-
tions of mentally disabled people is not implicated in the 
access of single women to AID facilities. The theory of sub-
stituted consent will not be analyzed here since it does not 
apply to the prospective AID mother, who is capable of 
making her own decisions. 
130. While it is true that the majority of welfare recipi-
ents are comprised of one parent families, this is due, at least 
in part, to welfare regulations. Of the 3,842,534 families on 
welfare, only 5 perce'nt of 192,603 are two parent house-
holds. However, in 24 of the 50 states, two parent families 
do not qualify for welfare no matter what their income. 
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state may even go so far as to say that these chil-
dren will necessarily be malajusted and will not 
contribute to society either because they will be-
come criminals or will be deviant in some other~ 
way. 
Even if it w~re true that single mothers are 
likely candidates for welfare rolls, the state would 
not thereby be justified in limiting access to AID. 
Since women are frequently poor as a result of 
discrimination, the state should not be permitted 
to compound these inequities by further discrimi-
nating against single women in the protection of 
their constitutional rights. Also, it should not be 
assumed that because a woman is not married she 
will be the sole economic support for her child. 
Many women seeking AID are part of lesbian 
couples or extended family arrangements and 
plan to raise the child in a family environment 
with other adults sharing parenting responsibili-
ties.131 Further, there is a compelling argument 
that a woman who goes through the trouble of 
artificially insemination wants very much to be a 
mother and has economically prepared for the 
expense of child-rearing. These are significant fac-
tors in the development of a well-adjusted child 
who will not grow up to be a burden on society. 132 
DEPENDENT CHILDREN UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, TI-
TLE IV A, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (E. 
Chief ed. 1981). 
131. Sutton, The Lesbian Family: Rights in Conflict Un-
der the California Uniform Parentage Act, 10 GoLDEN GATE 
L. REV. 1007 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sutton, Lesbian 
Family]. 
132. See generally Comment, Adoptees' Equal Protection 
Rights, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1314 (1981) and cases discussed 
therein. 
In addition to the asserted economic burdens on the state, 
an interest in the prospective child's well-being may be ad-
vanced in order to justify denying single women access to 
AID facilities. This argument is based on the assumption 
that life without a father is inherently disadvantageous to a 
child. See discussion of C.M. v. C.C., infra notes 219-21 and 
accompanying text. In that case, the court stressed the im-
portance of father-child relationships as its basis for granting 
donor paternity rights. 
However, in the face of growing numbers of single-parent 
families, experts no longer uniformly accept the assumption 
that single-parenthood is injurious to children. For instance, 
one article on the subject emphasizes that "single-parent 
families can have various strengths, including: provision for 
greater adult self-expression ... ; greater family nurturance 
than the previously unstable family experience of its mem-
bers; and greater exposure of the children to a wide variety 
of potential socializing agents and models." Verzaro & Hen-
non, Single-Parent Families: Myth and Reality, 72 J. HOME 
EcoN. 31, 32 (Fall 1980). See also Barry, A Research Project 
on Successful Single-Parent Families, 7 AM. J. FAM. THER-
APY 65 (Fall 1979). 
ii) Intervention in Existing Parent-Child Re-
lationships 
A second way to analyze the state interest in 
denying access to AID facilities is by analogy to 
cases where the state has intervened and termi-
nated a parent-child relationship. Termin'ation 
cases require a finding that the parent is unfit or 
that state intervention is in the best interest of the 
child. 133 
It should be noted that there are major distinc-
tions between state denial of access to AID facili-
ties and state intervention into existing family re-
lationships. First, state intrusion into an existing 
family is generally based upon some belief that 
parent-child relationships in that family are in-
adequate or unhealthy. This determination is 
based on the particular and unique circumstances 
of each family. Denial of access to AID facilities, 
on the other hand, constitutes a determination 
that single AID parenthood is per se harmful to 
the prospective child, without consideration of 
individual facts and circumstances. Furthermore, 
in the case of the prospective AID mother and 
child, the state is seeking to prevent the occur-
rence of that relationship rather than to terminate 
an existing relationship. In spite of these distinc-
tions, however, arguments used in termination 
cases may be raised by the state. For that reason, 
we will consider current legislative and judicial 
standards for termination as they might apply in 
the AID context. 
UNFITNESS ST AND ARD 
The traditional view holds that natural parents 
have a right to the custody of their children until 
and unless they are shown to be unfit. Applying 
this standard to the denial of equal access to AID 
facilities, the state would have the burden of 
proving the prospective AID mother is unfit be-
cause she is unmarried. 134 
133. "Termination involves the elimination of any legal 
recognition of a continuing parent-child relationship and, 
usually, the end of any social recognition of the relationship. 
This remedy may be contrasted with a custody order which 
vests a non-parent with temporary authority over a child, 
but does not eliminate the parent's residual right to reclaim 
the child at some later date.·· Boskey & McCue, Alternative 
Standards for the Termination of Parental Rights, 9 SETON 
HALL L. REv. 1, 4 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
134. A similar argument was used by the state in Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), but the Supreme Court 
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The "unfitness" standard focuses on the behav-
ior of the parent. Most legislation adhering to this 
view lists specific behavior deemed to constitute 
unfitness. 135 Often, this list includes a category 
labelled "neglect" which may be given a broad 
interpretation. For example, "neglect" may in-
clude: physical abuse, inadequate supervision or 
housekeeping, emotional neglect, inadequate par-
enting, sexual abuse, failure to provide medical 
care, parental conduct that constitutes contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor, and immoral or 
unconventional parental behavior. 136 
This standard focuses on the parent's qualifica-
tions for parenting. Intervention may therefore 
occur even when there is no clear evidence that 
the parent's behavior or lifestyle adversely affects 
the child. 137 Thus there have been cases, seem-
ingly aberrational, where the state has removed 
children from parents because the parents were 
unmarried or because the parent was the mother 
of an illegitimate child. 138 These cases reflect a 
rejected the state's presumption that unwed fathers are unfit 
per se. 
135. See, e.g., abandonment (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
435 (1974)); mental disability (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 
1510 (Smith-Hurd 1980)); habitual drunkenness (lowA CoDE 
ANN. § 232.4l(d) (West 1969)); child neglect (Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 453.040(4) (Vernon 1977)); alcoholism, substance 
abuse, moral depravity (CAL. C1v. CoDE § 232(a)(2) (West 
1982)); desertion for 90 days (HAw. REv. STAT. § 578-
2(c)(l)(A) (1976)). 
136. See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Ne-
glected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 
STANFORD L. REV. 985 (1975). 
137. See infra note 138. See also Sheppard, Lesbian Cus-
tody and A Quest for Normative Standards, WoMEN's RTs. 
L. REP (1983) (forthcoming). 
138. In re C., 468 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). In 
this case the Springfield, Missouri Court of Appeals wrote: 
The appellant has been promiscuous in the sense that 
that word means improperly indiscriminate in sexual 
relations, and her promiscuity has amounted to a con-
tinued course of conduct over a period of several years. 
The record permits the inference, as the trial court 
indicated in its findings, that the appellant may not be 
sure which of the men with whom she has lived is 
actually the father of her children. It has repeatedly 
been held in this state and elsewhere that proof of 
adultery amounting to promiscuity established paren-
tal unfitness in actions for the custody of children, and 
in our view it may also establish unfitness in a proceed-
ing to terminate parental rights, at least where, as 
here, there appears to be little likelihood of self-reha-
bilitation by the parent, and it appears probable that 
the child will be subjected to substantial immoral and 
debasing influences if left with the offending par-
ent .... The trial court found that the parents of 
these children were unfit bv reason of their debauch-
ery and repeated lewd and iascivious behavior. In our 
judicial presumption that the children of such 
parents are morally depraved. 
It is conceivable that a presumption of immoral 
or unconventional parental behavior would also 
influence state policy concerning single women's 
access to AID facilities. Yet morality and conven-
tion are not static concepts under the law, or in 
society. Judicial and legislative definitions of 
moral neglect traditionally are formulated on the 
basis of societal norms. As changes take place in 
the American family and accommodations to 
these changes evolve, it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult for a court to label a person presumptively 
unfit solely because she is not married. 139 The 
court cannot be blind to the fact that nearly one 
in five families with children is maintained by 
only one parent and more than 17 .1 % of all births 
are to unmarried women. 140 
BEST INTEREST ST AND ARD 
A best interest test focuses on the particular 
circumstances of the child rather than on the be-
havior or lifestyle of the parent. It is commonly 
opm10n, the judgment could be justified on that 
ground alone. 
Id. at 692 (footnote and citations omitted). The court also 
cited the following cases in support of its conclusion: Yount 
v. Yount, 366 S.W.2d 744, 748-49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); I. v. 
B., 305 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Craves v. 
Wooden, 291 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Mo. App. 1956); In re 
Morrison, 259 Iowa 301, 305, 144 N.W.2d 97, 102-03 
(1966); In re Welfare of Three Minors, 50 Wash.2d 653, 656, 
314 P.2d 423, 427 (1957); In re Johnson, 9 Wisc.2d 65, 72, 
100 N.W.2d 383, 390 (1960). See generally Note, The Cus-
tody Question and Child Neglect Rehearings, 35 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 478. 485 11968\. 
But see In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 260, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
252 (1967) (fact that the mother was living with a man to 
whom she was not married was not sufficient to justify adju-
dication of public wardship of her children); Ill re Cager, 
251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968) (illegitimate child cannot 
properly be judicially found to be neglected because of sole 
fact that he lives with a mother who has another illegitimate 
child living with her); Craig v. McBride, 8 FAM. L. REP. 
(BNA) 2229 (Alaska Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1982) ('"To avoid even 
the suggestion that a custody award stems from a life style 
conflict between a trial judge and a parent, we reiterate that 
trial courts must scrupulously avoid reference to such fac-
tors ... . "id.). 
139. But see supra note 138. 
140. Today, more than 17 .1 % of all births are to unmar-
ried women and nearly one in five families with children is 
maintained by only one parent. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
(102d ed. 1981); Developments in the Law-The Constitu-
tion and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1159 (1980). 
See also supra note 138, for discussion of cases dealing with 
this issue. 
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employed to settle custody disputes rather than 
termination petitions. Nevertheless, parental 
rights have been cut off without proof of unfitness 
in cases where the court determined that termina-
tion was in the child's best interest. 141 
A relaxation of the unfitness prerequisite for the 
termination of parental rights does not bode well 
for a liberalization of the parental rights of single 
women. Access to AID facilities can be no more 
protected than the right upon which it is based-
the right to establish a home and bring up a child. 
Looking at the circumstances surrounding the 
child rather than the parent, the state could allege 
as a basis for restricting access to AID facilities 
that an AID child who is born to a single woman 
(and who is without access to a father) would be 
in danger of suffering psychological harm. Such 
psychological harm is not in the best interest of a 
child, and on this basis a state employing the best 
interests standard could conceivably block pro-
spective single mothers from access to AID facili-
ties. 
However, there is serious debate over the con-
stitutional validity of applying this standard in 
termination proceedings. Critics allege that it is 
unconstitutionally vague, gives impermissibly 
broad discretion to judges, and fails to give the 
proper protection to the rights of parents to raise 
their children. 142 The best interest test fails to spell 
out the possible grounds for termination and rests 
on subjective judicial evaluation of all "relevant" 
criteria. 
In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supre.me Court re-
cently cast serious doubt on the state's power to 
terminate parental rights absent proof of unfit-
ness.143 In that case, the Court was not faced with 
deciding the constitutionality of the best interests 
141. See analysis of the changing standard for termina-
tion of parental rights in New Jersey in Boskey & McCue, 
Alternative Standards for the Termination of Parental 
Rights, 9 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (1978). See also Sorentino v. 
Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 367 
A.2d 1168 (1976) (Sorentino I) and 74 N.J. 313, 378 A.2d 18 
(1977) (Sore11tino II); In re Guardianship of D., C., E., and 
A., 169 N.J. Super. 230, 404 A.2d 663 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. 
l979) for examples of cases which seem to lean toward appli-
cation of the best interests standard in termination proceed-
ings. 
142. See Chemeninsky, Defining the "Best Interests": 
Constitutional Protections in Involuntary Adoptions, 18 J. 
FAM. L. 79 (1979). 
143. Santosky v. Kramer, 50 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. Mar. 
~4, 1982). 
test. There is dicta in the opinion, however, 
which strongly suggest that any test which does 
not require proof of unfitness is unconstitu-
tional. 144 
In essence, then, while the state may presently 
succeed in denying procreative rights under a 
mere best interests test, this standard may not 
withstand constitutional attack. 
B. Common Law Recognition of Donor Pater-
nity Claims 
The preceding section of this paper character-
ized the denial of equal access to AID facilities as 
a barrier to the exercise of a single woman's right 
to privacy in making decisions concerning procre-
ation and childrearing. The present section char-
acterizes the common law recognition of donor 
paternity claims as a second barrier to a single 
woman's exercise of privacy rights and also as a 
barrier to the exercise of the right to sole custody 
of the AID child. 
1. State Action 
When challenging a donor paternity claim un-
der the fourteenth amendment, the first inquiry is 
whether a state court's recognition of the pater-
nity claims of a known donor can be deemed state 
action. If so, the likelihood that such state action 
could be held to violate the rights of single moth-
ers of AID children must be assessed. 
The actions of a member of a state judiciary in 
his or her official capacity may constitute state 
action within the meaning of the fourteenth 
amendment. 145 In New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, the court characterized judicial action as 
144. "The Family Court judge in the present case ex-
pressly refused to terminate petitioners' parental rights on a 
'non-statutory, no-fault basis.' Nor is it clear that the State 
constitutionally could terminate a parent's rights without 
showing parental unfitness." Id. at 4337 n.10. See also, Quil-
loin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organi-
zation of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977). 
145. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880). 
"Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State govern-
ment, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without 
due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protec-
tion of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition, and as 
he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the 
State's power, his action is that of the State." See also Shelley 
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hughes v. Superior Court, 
339 U.S. 460 (1950); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, (1964). 
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state action, stating that "[t]he test is not the form 
in which state power has been applied but, what-
ever the form, whether such power has in fact 
been exercised." 146 
Donor paternity claims emerged as a second 
barrier to the single woman's right to single par-
enthood through AID in the New Jersey Superior 
Court decision in C.M. v. C. C. 147 In 'this case, the 
court found that the best interests of the child 
mandated the grant of paternity rights to a known 
donor who professed expectations of parenthood, 
even though the child's mother opposed the grant-
ing of such rights. 148 The decision involved judi-
cial consideration of the respective rights of the 
particular donor and donee. 149 
The decision in C. M. v. C. C. signals poten-
tially adverse consequences for single women who 
choose AID arrangements with known donors. It 
is a common law precedent that may well deter 
the practice of extra-professional methods of AID 
by persons similarly situated to the parties in that 
case. The court's refusal to recognize the mother's 
desire to be free from a donor's intervention in 
childrearing could in some cases curtail the single 
woman's right to conceive through AID alto-
gether. 
2) Denial of a Fundamental Right 
The presence of state action in the form of a 
judicial decision regarding paternal rights to a 
single mother's AID child, in conjunction with a 
denial of access to AID facilities, obstructs the 
single woman's right to procreate at two levels. 
While the denial of access to AID facilities limits 
the use of anonymous donors, the common law 
recognition of paternity claims discourages the use 
of known donors. A woman who is denied access 
to professional AID facilities, or who otherwise 
146. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
147. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 820 (Cumberland 
County Ct. 1977). 
148. Id. 
149. C.M. v. C.C. was never appealed. However, a chal-
lenge to state common law as Constitutionally invalid could 
possibly be brought before either the state or federal courts. 
See Nolen v. Wilson, 372 F.2d 15, 17 (1967): "The states 
themselves have a large capacity for self-correction of their 
institutions and officers. But when violations of fundamental 
rights or interests of the individual are both alleged and 
proved, which controlling law ha.s determined to be pro-
tected under the Constitution and laws of the United States, 
intervention by the federal district court to grant appropri-
ate relief is justified." 
chooses to conceive by known donor, risks the 
deprivation of her asserted right to single parent-
hood after her child is born. 
In asserting a right to single parenthood a single 
AID mother appears to be claiming for herself 
greater rights than are possessed by any other 
mother. In fact, however, the rights and responsi-
bilities of mothers of AID children are similar to 
the rights and responsibilities of mothers of other 
illegitimate children. The assertion of a right to be 
free from paternity claims in the case of AID 
mothers arises from the distinctions between do-
nors and fathers of other illegitimate children. 
These distinctions will be discussed in more detail 
below. 150 At this point, it should be noted that a 
donor, unlike other fathers, is probably not obli-
gated to assume any responsibility for his off-
spring unless he subsequently elects to do so. A 
donor is thus free from legal responsibilities until 
he claims legal rights. 151 
Those engaging in sexual relations assume re-
sponsibility for potential parental consequences. 
150. See infra Part IV, Section B(4). 
151. Research has revealed no paternity suits initiated by 
a donee against a donor. Nevertheless, at least in the case of 
an anonymous donor of semen provided to a licensed physi-
cian for use by a married woman, a donor's freedom from 
responsibility is a likely outgrowth of the People v. Sorensen 
rationale, see infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. 
This approach has been legislated in at least six states that 
have essentially adopted the following provision of the Uni-
form Parentage Act § 5(b): "The donor of semen provided to 
a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a 
married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law 
as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby con-
ceived," see CAL. C1v. CooE § 7005 (West Supp. 1980); 
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
61-306 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT: § 126.061 (1979); 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1982); WYO. 
STAT. § 14-2-103 (1980). 
The question then becomes whether the donee's marital 
status will affect the donor's legal responsibilities. A recent 
article in the Harvard Women's Law Journal can be read to 
stand for the proposition that, at least where a professional 
AID facility is used, a donor would not be obligated to the 
AID child of an unmarried woman: 
. .. the mother who wishes to separate herself totally 
from the child's father is well advised to be insemi-
nated only with the sperm of an anonymous donor. 
The solution must lie in allowing unmarried women to 
conceive by A.I. with anonymous donors, such as is 
now done by married women. 
Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial 
Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 
4 HARV. WoMEN°S L.J. 1, 16 (1981). 
The remaining issue, then, is whether an unmarried wom-
an's use of a known donor would (or should) make a differ-
ence with regard to the donor's rights and responsibilities, 
see discussion of C.M. v. C.C. infra note 168-71 and accom-
panying text. 
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The selection of an AID method of conception 
and the absence of sexual relations between a do-
nor and a donee implies a concerted effort to 
avoid these same consequences and to develop a 
wholly new understanding between biological 
parents. 152 A donor's ability to subsequently 
breach this understanding without the donee's 
consent is the basis of donor paternity claims. 
Equal access to AID facilities would permit sin-
gle women to conceive through the use of anony-
mous donors with professional assistance. In their 
attempt to protect donors from potential pater-
nity suits that might be instituted by donees, AID 
facilities are strict in their preservation of donor 
anonymity. 153 The incidental reciprocal advan-
tage of these policies for donees is the security of 
knowing that anonymous donors are unlikely to 
discover the identity of their children. 154 The pro-
tection afforded by this anonymity is particularly 
important if courts continue to recognize the pa-
ternal interests of known donors. 155 
It seems, then, that opening doors of AID facili-
ties to single women, without a corresponding 
recognition of the right to single parenthood 
through private and non-clinical AID methods, 
creates an inherently coercive situation. Women 
who want to be single parents will be forced to 
use professional AID facilities in order to preserve 
152. The authors can think of only one situation where 
this may not be the case. This is when the donee and donor 
are an .unmarried couple who have turned to AID after 
having unsuccessfully attempted to conceive through sexual 
intercourse. This situation is similar to that of a married 
couple's use of AIH (Artificial Insemination by Husband). In 
these unusual cases, however, it should be a fairly simple 
matter for the donor to present evidence of parental expecta-
tions, and thus gain the rights of other unwed fathers. See 
infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text for discussion of 
the comparisons and distinctions between donors and unwed 
natural fathers. 
153. See Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best 
Interests of the Sperm Donor 14 FAM. L. Q. 1 (1980). The 
thesis of this article is that most of the informal policies 
concerning AID as it is presently practiced in the United 
States are based on exaggerated fear of potential suits for 
parental obligations against donors. Recordkeeping on do-
nors is minimal or non-existent as a result of this fear, even 
though there are no such suits reported. See also text accom-
panying notes 11-14 (the Curie-Cohen survey revealed that 
92. 2 % of the doctors surveyed kept permanent records of 
recipients, 36. 9 % kept permanent records on children born 
after artificial insemination, and only 30.4 % did so on do-
nors. Curie-Cohen survey, supra note 11, at 588). 
154. Id. 
155. See discussion of C.M. v. C.C. infra text accompa-
nying notes 168-71. 
their parental rights. The possibility that known 
donors may be granted paternity rights by the 
courts is clearly an inducement to use anonymous 
donors. 
As women turn to the use of professional AID 
facilities to the exclusion of other options, AID 
conception will be under increasing state control. 
In the interests of public health and safety, the 
state can claim the power to regulate the process 
by choosing which genetic material is stored, se-
lected, and distributed. 156 The intensely private 
act of conception may be taken into the social 
sphere of reproductive engineering when AID is 
involved. 
Unlike women who conceive in traditional 
ways, the AID mother may well feel compelled to 
acquiesce in such state eugenic policies. Her desire 
to maintain autonomous control over conception, 
the dangers of clinical donor screening, and the 
political implications of eugenic decisions made 
without her input may pale in comparison to her 
desire to conceive free from the risks associated 
with known donors. 157 
A limited necessity for state control of AID fa-
cilities arises ftom the difficulties associated with 
an anonymous donor pool. For example, the fail-
ure to keep permanent records of donors and their 
issue in order to conceal their identity results in a 
potential for consanguinity, inbreeding, and the 
repeated transfer of inheritable disease. 158 These 
problems indicate a need to regulate the anony-
mous donor pool. However, there is no corre-
sponding rationale to limit or regulate the use of 
known donors. One can expect no greater genetic 
problems in children that result from the private 
156. Although there may be general agreement with the 
practice of negative eugenics (prevention of eugenic dis-
eases), the practice of positive eugenics (genetic improve-
ment) is controversial. Donor selection is often done by phy-
sicians not trained for the task and clearly reflects their bias. 
See Kindregan, State Power Over Human Fertility and Indi-
vidual Liberty, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1401 (1972). 
157. See supra Section II, Parts A-C. 
158. Id. Using a single donor for many recipients may 
result in inadvertent consanguinity or inbreeding. AID prac-
titioners inadequately protect against this result. Few have 
policies limiting the number of times a single donor will be 
used within one community. Since permanent records of 
donors are seldom kept and the identity of donors is almost 
always concealed, a recipient may be inseminated with the 
semen of a relative and two AID children sharing the same 
genetic father could conceivably mate. 
Donors are usually selected by the physician who performs 
the insemination. They may find the donors themselves, or 
use sperm banks or donors selected by associates. 
(1982)] NOTE/AID 275 
selection of a donor by a donee or go-between 
than result from the random selection of mates 
throughout the population. 
Single women who resist this coercion and pri-
vately arrange artificial insemination with known 
donors may do so based on concern for the child's 
future health. The increasing importance of pre-
ventive health measures that utilize family health 
records, and the possible psychological impor-
tance to the children of being able to identify their 
roots, makes knowledge about donors crucial. If 
this is the woman's judgment, then she presently 
assumes the risks associated with the court's 
power to transform a donor into a father with 
equal rights in the AID child. 159 
3) Discrimination on the Basis of Marital Sta-
tus 
Discrimination by the state in the enjoyment of 
privacy rights is apparent in granting paternity 
rights to known donors to single women when 
anonymous donors to married women have no 
such rights. The decision in C.M. v. C. C. 160 con-
stitutes a special exception to the established pol-
icy that the status of a donor cannot be equated 
with that of a legal father. 161 Arguably, this ex-
ception was made "because of" rather than "in 
spite of' the marital status of the donee, and con-
stitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 162 
159. See, e.g., discussion of C.M. v. CC., infra text 
accompanying notes 168-71. 
160. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland 
County Ct. 1977). 
161. This "special exception" is most clearly understood 
upon examination of the facts of C.M. v. C.C. In that case, 
the AID mother was single, and she and the known donor 
were friends who had been dating and had discussed mar-
riage. According to the opinion by the Cumberland County 
Court in New Jersey, C.C. wanted a child "and wanted 
(C.M.) to be the father, but did not want to have intercourse 
with him before their marriage." Id. at 161, 377 A.2d at 
821-22. It was not until after conception of the AID child 
that their relationship changed, leading to C.C.'s wish to 
raise the child on her own. Id. See infra notes 168-171 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the court's rationale in 
granting visitation rights to the donor. 
The situation in C.M. v. C.C. is readily distinguishable 
from cases involving anonymous donors, who have abso-
lutely no parental expectations and thus have not been 
viewed as either the legal or natural father, see People v. 
Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 
(1968); UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT §§ 5(a)-(b), 9A U.L.A. 592-93 
(1979). 
162. Accord Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256 (1978), where the Court discussed the need to 
Court decisions concerning custody, support 
and visitation of AID children have declined to 
view the donor as the legal father when the donee 
is married. 163 Furthermore, although the donor is 
not legally considered the father, courts have been 
reluctant to announce the AID mother's husband 
as the legal father even when he had consented to 
the conception; instead courts have deemed AID 
children illegitimate. 164 It was not until recently, 
in People v. Sorenson, 165 that the court imposed 
the status of legal father on the husband of a 
married donee where he had given his consent to 
the procedure. In that case the court wrote: 
A child conceived through heterologous 
(AID) artificial insemination does not have a 
"natural father" as that term is commonly 
used. The anonymous donor of the sperm 
cannot be considered the "natural father," 
as he is no more responsible for the use made 
of his sperm than is the donor of blood or a 
kidney . . . . Since there is no "natural fa-
ther," we can only look for a lawful fa-
ther .... [A] reasonable man who, because 
of his inability to procreate, actively partici-
pates and consents to his wife's artificial in-
semination in the hope that a child will be 
produced whom they will treat as their own, 
knows that such behavior carried with it the 
demonstrate that discriminatory impact on a group can be 
traced to a discriminatory purpose when making an equal 
protection claim. The Court wrote that " 'discriminatory 
purpose,' ... implies more than intent as violation or intent 
as awareness of consequences .... (citation omitted). It 
implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a 
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,· and 
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group." Id. at 279. 
163. See People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 
66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968); Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 
2308 (1955) (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954); 
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 
(1963); Strnad v. Strnad 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 
(1948). 
164. See Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 
(1955) (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954); 
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 
(1963); cf. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc.2d 886, 246 
N.Y.S.2d 835 (1964) (where the court relied on Gursky, but 
held the husband liable for support without actually ruling 
on the legitimacy of the children). But see In re Adoption of 
Anonymous, 74 Misc.2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973) (hold-
ing that "a child born of consensual AID during a valid 
marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and privi-
leges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage." 
Id. at 105, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435-36). 
165. 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968). 
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legal responsibilities of fatherhood and crim-
inal responsibility for non-support.166 
Past decisions indicate that the best interest of 
the AID child was not always the determinative 
factor in the proceedings. For, instance, the court 
has proclaimed a child illegitimate or as being 
without either a legal or natural father rather 
than imposing responsibility for a child upon an 
unwilling husband. 167 
In the decisions concerning husbands of AID 
mothers, the granting of legal father status occurs 
when the husband indicates voluntary assumption 
of the responsibilities of fatherhood by giving his 
consent to the procedure. By focusing on the hus-
band's consent, the courts reveal a concern for 
protecting the husband from parental responsibil'-
ities not of his choosing. Though none of these 
decisions involve known donors, the courts are 
likely to similarly protect a known donor if he 
resists the responsibilities of fatherhood and lacks 
paternal expectations at the time of the insemina-
tion. 
In C.M. v. C.C. the court professed to grant 
the legal status of father to a known donor be-
cause "there was no one else who was in a position 
to take upon himself the responsibilities of father-
hood when the child was conceived." 168 The court 
went on to say that "C.M.'s consent and active 
participation in the procedure leading to concep-
tion should place upon him the responsibilities of 
fatherhood. The court will not deny him the priv-
ilege of fatherhood."169 
In ruling for the donor, the court did not limit 
itself to addressing the best interests of the child. 
Rather, the court emphasized the donor's expecta-
tions as a determining factor in conferring the 
status of legal father. 
The decision in C.M. v. C.C. considers the 
parental expectations of the father and then seems 
to assume that the existence of a man willing to be 
a father is bound to be in the best interests of the 
child. No corresponding consideration is given to 
the mother's expectations, or the possibility that 
single parenthood would be in the best interests of 
166. Id. at 284-85, 437 P.2d at 498-99, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 
10-11. 
167. See supra note 164. 
168. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 167, 377 A.2d 
821, 824 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977). 
169. Id. at 168, 377 A.2d at 825. 
the child. Instead of carefully considering the two 
possible arrangements, the court makes a pre-
sumption in favor of the father. The presumption 
that a father per se is good for the child can be 
seen as purposeful discrimination against single 
women, and lacks consideration of the child's in-
terests. 
If the presumption that a legal father is always 
good for a child were truly based on the child's 
best interests, then it would be applied in all cases 
whether the woman was married or not. Yet in 
some cases, such a presumption in favor of legal 
fatherhood was not applied even when there was 
a husband available to assume the role. 110 
The presumption is more likely based upon a 
bias in 1favor of the traditional family structure 
and opposed to a family that is the result of only a 
mother's efforts. However, denial of single moth-
erhood is not a rational or effective means of pro-
moting this traditional family unit since father-
less children are far more .often 'the result of 
illegitimacy and divorce than of AID. 171 An at-
tempt to stifle the single woman's use of AID will 
not significantly diminish the number of women-
headed households. 
A presumption in favor of paternal rights can 
be expected to restrict the definition of parent-
hood to the more traditional mother/father house-
hold. However preferable this may seem, in it 
remains to be answered whether it is appropriate 
to discourage single women, who are capable and 
desirous of loving and providing for children, 
from doing so. In light of the many single parent 
households that presently exist, it is possible that 
the "ideal" family is so far from common reality 
that the professed state interest in paternal rights 
serves primarily as an excuse to prohibit the legal 
recognition of new family relationships. / 
In dealing with these questions, the presump-
tion that any father who expressed parental inter-
est is 1 always better than no father at all needs 
closer examination. The more appropriate stand-
ard would be for courts to determine what is truly 
in the child's best interests on a case-by-case basis. 
170. See Doornbos v. Doornbos; 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 
(1955) (Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954); 
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 
(1963); see generally supra text accompanying note 164. 
171.. See Curie-Cohen Survey, supra note 11, at 588 (sur-
vey estimates 5,400 AID births per year). 
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4) State Interests 
The preceding section characterized the com-
mon law recognition of donor paternity claims as 
a barrier to the single woman's achievement of 
single parenthood through AID. This barrier rep-
resents potential violations of due process and 
equal protection. The due process violation arises 
from the court's use of marital status as a classifi-
cation that serves to deny single women the free-
dom from donor paternity claims that is granted 
to married women. 
As discussed earlier in this paper, the denial of a 
fundamental right invokes strict scrutiny of the 
state interests that are offered in justification of 
this denial. Therefore, it is necessary to identify 
the state interests and to determine whether they 
are sufficiently compelling b> justify abridgment 
of the asserted constitutional rights. The common 
law recognition of donor paternity claims is 
rooted in state policies that a) protect the consti-
tutional rights of unwed fathers and b) promote 
the best interests of children in custody decisions. 
a. Rights of the Donor 
The state's interest in protecting the rights of 
the donor can be traced to cases recognizing the' 
equal protection and due process rights of illegiti-
mate fathers. 172 The landmark case in this area is 
Stanley v. Illinois. 173 
In Stanley v. Illinois, petitioner contested an 
Illinois law which provided that parents were en-
titled to a hearing on their fitness before their 
children could be removed from their custody, 
but denied such a hearing to unmarried fathers. 
Denial of a hearing, the petitioner argued, was a 
violation of his right to procedural due process. 
Further, since the statute did not apply to unwed 
mothers, the petitioner argued that he had been 
denied equal protection of the law. The Court 
analyzed each claim separately and ultimately 
found for petitioner on each point. 
The Court held the statute unconstitutional be-
cause it presumed all unmarried fathers were un-· 
fit per se. In evaluating the privacy interest at 
stake in Stanley, the Court wrote that "the rights 
172. For cases discussing the equal protection and due 
process rights of illegitimate fatheI·s, see Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quillo.in v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 
246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
173. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
to conceive and to raise one's children have been 
deemed 'essential,' ... '[r]ights far more pre-
cious . . . than property rights'. . . . " 174 Custody 
and control of one's children could not be denied 
any parent without a hearing on the question of 
parental fitness. Presuming rather than proving 
parental unfitness, even if more convenient and 
efficient for the State, is repugnant to the Consti-
tution and impermissible. 
In Caban v. Mohammed an unwed natural fa-
ther of two children challenged the constitutional-
ity of a New York statute that granted an unwed 
mother the authority to block the adoption of her 
child by withholding her consent, but did not give 
an unwed father a similar right. 175 The statute 
was held to violate the equal protection and due 
process clauses because it withheld from the fa-
ther substantive rights granted to all other classes 
of parents. 176 
In these cases the Court has recognized the pro-
tectible due process interests of parents in the 
"companionship, care, custody, and management 
of his or her children." 177 The privacy interest 
involved here, "that of a man and the children he 
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference 
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, 
protection." 178 The unwed father is entitled to 
notice and the opportunity for a hearing that is 
granted to all other classes of parents under the 
equal protection clause. 179 
One can applaud this line of cases upholding 
the rights of illegitimate fathers as an encourage-
ment of male involvement in the responsibilities 
and benefits of child rearing. If men are to be 
more involved with the nurturing of the children 
that they bring into the world as a result of their 
relationships with women, they must benefit 
equally from the legal protections available to 
mothers. 
Nevertheless, while the strengthening of the le-
gal parental rights of illegitimate fathers may be 
laudable, those same parental rights should not 
automatically be applicable to a donor .180 Rights 
174. Id. at 651 (citations omitted). 
175. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
176. Id. at 391, 394. 
177. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 658. 
180. Judge Testa in C.M. v. C.C. had a different opinion, 
and wrote that "if an unmarried woman conceives a child 
through artificial insemination from semen from a known 
man, that man cannot be considered to be less a father 
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and responsibilities should be commensurate with 
the actions that invoke them. 
The Court has shown itself to be fully capable 
of recognizing such distinctions. In Quilloin v. 
Willcott, the Court found that the principles of 
the equal protection clause did not give an un-
married father the same authority as a divorced 
father to veto the adoption of his child. The state 
was not foreclosed from recognizing the "differ-
ence in the extent of commitment to the welfare 
of the child" 181 between that of an unwed father 
who had never shouldered any significant respon-
sibility for the child's rearing and that of a di-
vorced father who at least will have borne some 
responsibility for the child's rearing. 182 
The Quilloin court examined the unwed fa-
ther's due process claim separately, and deter-
mined that his substantive parental rights were 
not overridden by the state's finding that adoption 
was in the best interests of the child. 183 The Court 
wrote that: 
the Due Process Clause would be offended 
"[i]f a State were to attempt to force the 
breakup of a natural family over the objec-
tions of the parents and their children, with-
out some showing of unfitness and for the 
sole reason that to do so was thought to be in 
the children's best interest." 184 
In Quilloin, however, the adoption gave "full rec-
ognition to a family unit already in existence, a 
result desired by all concerned, except appel-
lant." 185 The unwed father never had or sought 
because he is not married to the woman." 152 N.J. Super. 
160, 167, 377 A.2d 821, 824 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977). 
181. 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). 
182. Id. See also Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), 
for an example of a factual context in which the state can 
limit the paternal rights of illegitimate fathers. In Parham a 
statute that denied the father of an illegitimate child the 
right to sue for the child's wrongful death was upheld. The 
Court held that the statutory bar against illegitimate fathers 
was not discriminatory and was rationally related to the 
legitimate state interest of maintaining an accurate and effi-
cient system for disposition of property at death. Although 
mothers of illegitimate children were permitted to sue, the 
Court found no basis for a sex discrimination claim since the 
varying treatment was based on actual differences in their 
situation rather than on overbroad generalizations regarding 
sex. Only a father could make an illegitimate child legiti-
mate by voluntary, unilateral action under the state's law. 
183. 434 U.S. 246, 254 (1978). 
184. Id. at 255 (quoting from Smith v. Organization of 
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
185. Id. 
actual legal custody, so no finding of unfitness 
was necessary .186 A finding in favor of the adop-
tion according to "the best interests of the child" 
standard did not offend the unwed father's due 
process rights. 187 
Stanley and Caban can be reconciled with 
Quilloin by examining the different standards 
used by the Court to protect the paternal interests 
in each situation. In Stanley and Caban the court 
required proof of the fathers' unfitness before 
their due process interests in the child Could be 
terminated. 188 In Quilloin, the father's interests 
were held to be adequately protected by the "best 
interests of the child" standard under both the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment. 189 
Thus, courts apply different standards depend-
ing upon whether a relationship with the children 
as de facto fathers has been established by the 
biological fathers before the court. 190 In Quilloin, 
the biological father had never lived with the 
child nor shared childrearing responsibilities. In 
Stanley and Caban, on the other hand, the fathers 
had maintained a relationship with their children 
as psychological parents. They resided with the 
mothers and children as part of a family unit at 
some point in time and contributed to their sup-
port. 
The status of the biological fathers as de facto 
parents presented the Court with the question of 
whether an existing family could be justifiably 
altered. The Stanley Court decided that when the 
issue is the dismemberment of a family, the state 
must prove rather than presume unfitness of the 
parent. 191 This was the only sound means of pro-
moting the Court's stated interest in preserving 
"the minor's family ties whenever possible, re-
moving him from the custody of his parents only 
when his welfare or safety or the protection of the 
public cannot be adequately safeguarded without 
removal." 192 
In Quilloin, the father's involvement in the 
lives of his biological children as a de facto father 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. 405 U.S. 645 (1972); 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
189. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
190. Sutton, Lesbian Family, supra note 131. 
191. 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972). 
192. Id. at 652 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., c.37, § 701-2, the 
Illinois child neglect statute). 
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was minimal. 193 Absent this de facto parental re-
lationship, the state was required to demonstrate 
only that the adoption and denial of legitimation 
was in the "best interests of the child." 194 This 
standard served the substantial state interest in 
maintaining continuity for the children of an ex-
isting family unit. 195 
This analysis of the rights of unwed fathers is by 
no means intended to convey the idea that an 
anonymous donor has the same paternal interests 
in the AID child as belong to the natural father of 
an illegitimate child. The anonymous donor is not 
the natural father as that term is normally used. 196 
In donating his sperm for professional services 
with the clear expectation of preserving anonym-
ity, the donor has no expectation of enjoying the 
paternal rights ordinarily- due biological fathers 
under the due process clause. 197 It has been suc-
cinctly stated that "the donor's biological tie trig-
gers Stanley rights, but his lack of familial expec-
tations regarding any assertion of those rights 
under the circumstances of the donation operate 
both as his consent to their relinquishment and as 
his elimination as the child's natural father at 
law." 19s 
When a known donor is involved in the concep-
tion of an AID child, the situation is more com-
plex. If the donor wishes to claim paternity rights 
in the AID child, he shares the same burdens as 
those imposed on illegitimate fathers. First, the 
donor must prove his biological paternity. 199 Even 
if the donor is able to prove biological fatherhood, 
it is doubtful that the court would then equate the 
legal status of a known donor with that of an 
illegitimate father, without more. For example, 
in a paternity proceeding against a natural father, 
proof of biological fatherhood would result in 
support obligations regardless of the father's ex-
pectations. 200 However, there has not yet been a 
193. 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). 
194. Id. at 255. 
195. Id. 
196. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 
Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968). 
197. Sutton, Lesbian Family, supra note 131, at 1029. 
198. Id. (emphasis in original). 
199. Id. at 1022-24. 
200. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. ~535 (1973). 
In one paternity suit brought before Family Court in 
Manhattan, the alleged father of an illegitimate child sought 
to make parental expectations a relevant element of his de-
fense. Frank Serpico, the defendant, claimed that he was 
fraudulently assured by the child's 1nother that she was prac-
ticing birth control when she wa~; actually trying to con-
case imposing obligations of fatherhood on a 
proven known donor when these obligations are 
not consistent with his expectations. One may as-
sume that if a donee instituted suit against a 
known donor for support, the court will find it 
necessary in the interests of fairness to receive 
evidence regarding the donor's familial expecta-
tions at the time of the donation before imposing 
such obligations. 
Accordingly, in the interests of fairness to the 
single mother of an AID child, the court should 
find it relevant to consider the familial expecta-
tions of a known donor before recognizing the 
donor's paternal rights in a suit brought by the 
donor against the donee. The donor should be 
required to come forth with evidence that it was 
his intention at the time of insemination that he 
would be a father to the child. The donee should 
be given the opportunity to rebut this evidence 
and to come forth with her own contrary infor-
mation. 
ceive. Serpico was represented by Karen DeCrow, a promi-
nent feminist and former president of the National 
Organization for Women. The supposed objective of the 
defense was equality between the sexes in matters of procre-
ative choice. Defense counsel argued that a support order 
would deny Serpico his constitutional right to choose 
whether or not to become a parent. This right, based on 
Supreme Court decisions authorizing the availability of con-
traceptives and abortion, applied to men as well as to 
women. Trial Judge Dembity held for Serpico in that the 
"[p]etitioner's wrong precludes her transfer to him of her 
financial burden for the child she alone chose to bear." It is 
not clear whether the judge based this decision on the moth-
er's fraud, the father's claimed right to choose, or both. 
Margolick, Paternity Suit Focuses 011 Feminism and Free-
dom, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1981, at Bl, col. 1. 
In evaluating the validity of parental expectations in the 
context of children conceived through intercourse, it is im-
portant to distinguish three distinct aspects of procreative 
choice: 1) the right to conceive, 2) the right to bear and 
3) the right to rear a child. Only a woman is entitled to the 
protection of her right to choose whether to bear a child. 
Thus, a father's rights of choice in the decisions to conceive 
or rear a child are distinguishable from the "right to choose" 
to abort accorded women in Roe. It is fair to say, however, 
that men and women should have equal rights in the concep-
tion and rearing of children. This would place the burden of 
contraception as well as child support on both sexes. A man 
who chooses not to have a child should be held responsible 
for child support even if he personally took the necessary 
contraceptive precautions. To find otherwise would allocate 
the risks associated with birth control and the burden of 
unintentional births exclusively on women. It is prohibi-
tively difficult to prove whether a conception resulted from 
defective birth control or intentional planning. 
We suggest that no such difficulty exists in the situation of 
an AID donor. The act of abstaining from sexual intercourse 
indicates a decision to forgo the associated risks and to reject 
parental rights and responsibilities. 
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If the donor makes a sufficient showing of fa-
milial expectations a court could be justified in 
recognizing the paternal interests of a donor as 
being similar to those of an unwed father. That is, 
proof of the donor's parental expectations is the 
~hreshold requirement for standing to assert even 
those limited paternal rights automatically vested 
in unwed natural fathers. 
The known donor who meets this threshold re-
quirement, like the recognized natural father, is 
entitled to certain due process procedural protec-
tions which are accorded all unwed fathers. These 
include the right to notice and the opportunity for 
a hearing before changes in custody arrangements 
are made. 201 It is uncertain, however, whether 
such a donor is entitled to have his substantive 
rights protected by the application of the standard 
used in Quilloin or that used in Stanley. 202 Quil-
loin holds that, in the absence of a de facto paren-
tal relationship, an unwed father's substantive 
rights are adequately protected by application of 
the "best interests of the child" standard. 203 In 
Stanley, the unwed father had maintained a rela-
tionship with his two children for years, and was 
entitled to recognition and preservation of his pa-
rental rights absent a showing of his "unfit-
ness."204 
Donor paternity claims are distinguishable 
from the unwed father's claims that have been 
recognized in cases employing the strict unfitness 
standard. These distinctions allow a court to find 
against a donor without an actual showing of the 
donor's unfitness. First, both Stanley and Caban 
involved the protection of an existing paternal 
relationship against competing custodial claims of 
the state. In comparison, the known donor does 
not compete with the custodial claims of others 
who are seeking to supplant his existing paternal 
role, but with the single mother seeking sole cus-
tody. Second, Stanley and Caban sought to pro-
tect an existing family unit in which the unwed 
father exercised the role of a de facto parent. In 
the case of a known donor's paternal claims, how-
ever, the state would not be breaking up a natural 
family unit by denying paternal custody or visita-
tion to the known donor. In fact, the recognition 
201. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 173-95 for full 
discussion of these standards. 
203. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). 
of the paternal rights of a donor may result in the 
disruption of the family unit to which the single 
woman already belongs. 
It should be mentioned that the known donor 
who petitions for paternal rights immediately af-
ter the AID child's birth has not had the opportu-
nity to serve as a de facto parent. The application 
of the Quilloin "best interests" standard rather 
than the Stanley "unfitness" standard is not a pu-
nitive measure, however. Rather, it is a recogni-
tion that the best interests of the child should be 
the court's foremost concern whenever the unwed 
father's commitment to the child is minimal. A 
known donor, even one with parental expecta-
tions, exhibits a commitment to the child which is 
as minimal as that of any unwed father who con-
tributes nothing more than genetic material.2°5 
The courts may therefore refuse to acknowledge 
the paternal interests of the known donor if it can 
be shown that it would be in the best interest of 
the child to do so. This standard offers adequate 
protection of the donor's interests under the due 
process and equal protection clauses. 206 
b. Best Interest of the Child 
In any custody dispute between a donor and 
the mother of an AID child, the courts will weigh 
three competing interests: the asserted rights of 
the AID mother, the asserted paternity claim of 
the donor, and the best interest of the AID child. 
Before an analysis based upon the intersection of 
these interests can be considered, it is necessary to 
set out the manner in which courts have treated 
each of these issues as they have arisen within 
more traditional frameworks. This section will 
present, briefly, the historical treatment of child 
custody actions. 
Judicial treatment of custody actions has, for 
the most part, paralleled society's treatment of 
women and roles within the family. 207 Histori-
cally, English common law gave custody of chil-
dren to fathers at the termination of a marriage. 
204. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972). 
205. For discussion of the exception to this statement, see 
supra note 152. 
206. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
207. For a socioeconomic analysis of family law as it de-
veloped in the United States, See WoMEN AND REVOLUTION 
(L. Sargent ed. 1981). See also J. MITCHELL, WOMEN'S Es-
TATE (1971), F. ENGELS, The Origins of the Family, Private 
Property and the State, in SELECTED WoRKS II (1962). 
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These decisions were consistent with the then 
prominent idea that a man, as head of his family, 
had a paramount right to the custody, care and 
services of his children. This was a valuable prop-
erty right at that time, since children were a fi-
nancial asset to the family unit. 
This presumption favoring paternal rights had 
been written into Roman Law and was carried 
over to the English and American legal systems. 208 
One American decision reflec~ting this view is an 
1857 case decided in New York. In People v. 
Humphries, the court, while acknowledging that 
the husband was a wife beater, found that fact no 
bar to his right to the custody of his children. 209 
The only perplexing question seen by that court 
was how to separate a brea~tfeeding child from 
the bosom of her mother. Thus, the court stated, 
The only difficulty, if any, in the present 
case in regard to the right of the father to 
retain the child, arises from the child being 
of tender age, and deriving its sustenance, in 
part, from the breast of the mother. But 
upon the evidence, I think these circum-
stances form no obstacle to the father's 
right. 210 
After considering the question, the court still 
found the father's right to override the interests of 
the mother and the child. 
The judicial policy favoring a father's right to 
custody was replaced over time by a policy which 
granted a nearly prima facie right to the mother. 
This trend occurred simultaneously with changes 
in the socio-economic role of women. As industri-
alization moved "breadwinners" away from the 
home, the woman's role as the sole caretaker of 
the family became more pronounced. Woman's 
work became more clearly defined as distinct 
from the role of the husband and the father. The 
fact that the man had a job outside of the home 
forced the woman to accept full responsibility for 
maintaining the home and the children in it. This 
division of labor was justified by the view that, 
because the woman is the one who conceives and 
bears the children, her role as mother must be 
accepted as her biological destiny. Since the 
woman was believed to be the prime nurturer and 
208. King, Child Custody-A Legal Problem?, 54 CAL. 
ST. B.J. 156 (1979). 
209. 24 Barb. 521, 523 (1857). 
210. Id. 
caretaker of children, it was also assumed that it 
was in the best interest of the children to be in the 
custody of their mother. As one court put it, there 
is no substitute for "motherly love." 211 
This "tender years" doctrine holds that, absent 
a compelling reason for placing custody else-
where, a mother is entitled to the custody of her 
children. When both parents are deemed fit, the 
doctrine swings the scale in favor of the mother if 
the child is of "tender years." 212 
Gradually, this presumption came to be looked 
at with skepticism. Some jurisdictions that contin-
ued to apply it no longer relied on the romantic 
idea that a mother is somehow more fit for cus-
tody than a father. Instead, these courts utilized 
the doctrine as a procedural tool for deciding cus-
tody where the facts did not dictate a contrary 
result. 213 
In recent years, an increasing number of juris-
dictions have abandoned gender-based doctrines 
altogether and have embraced a sex-neutral 
standard intended to consider only the "best inter-
est of the child." Under the best interest rule, 
courts consider the physical, intellectual, moral 
and spiritual well being of the child. Any factor 
bearing on the child's well-being is relevant. 214 
Since the courts have wide discretion in this area, 
and because matters such as these are subjective, 
parents in custody actions in which the best inter-
est standard is applied are subject to the personal 
opinions and beliefs of the judge hearing the 
case. 215 
211. Meinhart v. Meinhart, 261 Minn. 272, 111 N.W.2d 
782 (1961). 
212. A child is considered to be of tender years until the 
beginning of his or her teenage years. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY 
LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1977). 
213. The "tender years" presumption does not reflect or 
derive from the mother's "right," whether that right be char-
acterized as "prima facie" or otherwise. It is procedural 
only. One party or the other must have the burden of proof. 
Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. 229, 
312 A.2d 58 (1973). 
214. Factors which courts might consider in deciding a 
child custody case include issues of a parent's morality, char-
acter, past misconduct, past mental or emotional illness, 
current marital status, neglect and cruelty, interracial mar-
riage, full-time employment, characteristics of the proposed 
home, preference of the child, religion, homosexuality and 
financial ability. PENN. BAR INSTITUTE, FACTORS DETERMIN-
ING THE AWARD OF CUSTODY BETWEEN PARENTS (1979). 
215. For instance, in Krabel v. Krabel, the court ruled 
that the mother could only retain custody if she "has either 
married or broken off the relationship, and her present con-
duct establishes the improbability of future 'lapses.' "8 FAM. 
L. REP. {BNA) 2249 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Dec. 18, 1981, 
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In many cases, competing parties in custody 
actions stand in relatively equal positions before 
the deciding judge. Custody disputes often follow 
the break-up of a marriage between two people of 
similar backgrounds and social position. Both par-
ties are fit to be parents, and it remains for the 
judge to determine what is best for the child. 
The "best interest" standard presumes that nei-
ther parent is necessarily more fit because of his or 
her gender. Custody must be determined accord-
ing to the character of the individual parents and 
their specific family situations. Persons involved 
in less conventional custody disputes, however, 
are more likely to suffer from this broad judicial 
discretion than are their counterparts in more tra-
ditional family settings. This is because of the 
judicial preference for two-parent heterosexual 
families. This bias is boldly stated in C.M. v. 
C.C: "It is in a child's best interest to have two 
parents whenever possible." 216 
Such an attitude clouds the specific circum-
stances of each custody case, as the judge may be 
unable to prevent his belief that the traditional 
nuclear family is best from influencing his view of 
the needs of single parent children. The judicial 
discretion permitted to make each custody deci-
sion unique cannot be free from social bias, thus 
obscuring the individual circumstances of each 
case. 
Although the best interest standard was de-
signed to correct the bias inherent in gender-based 
doctrines, 217 the application of this standard raises 
serious constitutional questions in some cases. The 
released Jan. 25, 1982). See also Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill.2d 
377, 400 N .E.2d 421 (1979) (open and continuing cohabita-
tion of mother with her boyfriend was sufficient reason to 
remove children from mother's custody and grant custody to 
father). 
On the other hand, a recent Alaska Supreme Court deci-
sion held that "[t]o avoid even the suggestion that a custody 
award stems from a life style conflict between a trial judge 
and a parent, we reiterate that trial courts must scrupulously 
avoid reference to such factors .... " Craig v. McBride, 8 
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2229 (Alaska Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1982). A 
court's failure to explicitly refer to lifestyle factors in custody 
cases does not mean that these factors are not considered, 
however. For a discussion of how judicial biases regarding 
life styles affects the outcome of termination of parental 
rights cases, see supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
216. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 167, 377 A.2d 821, 825 (Cum-
berland County Ct. 1977). 
217. It has been argued that the tender years doctrine is a 
violation of equal protection and due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as 
well as a violation of the Equal Rights Amendments of the 
dominant social influence of majoritarian values 
precludes the judicial consideration of the rights 
of non-traditional parents under the best interest 
standard. However, this majoritarian preference 
is vulnerable to challenge on fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection and due process grounds, 
as well as on grounds that such bias violates the 
parent's rights under the first amendment to free-
dom of expression and association. 218 
The case of C.M. v. C.C. 219 is a good example 
of the problems that arise in an unconventional 
custody dispute. A careful analysis of that case 
reveals: (1) the failure of the best interest stand-
ard to accomplish its presumed goal of focusing on 
the individuality of each case rather than apply-
ing a blanket stereotype; (2) the inconsistency 
with which courts deal with donors; and (3) the 
absence of concern for the individual rights of the 
single AID mother. 
In C.M. v. C.C., 220 the court does not even 
entertain the possibility of leaving the child in the 
sole custody of the mother, without interference 
by the donor. The court did not attempt to weigh 
the competing arrangements to determine which 
would be in the child's best interests. Instead it 
adopted the judicial "policy favoring the require-
ment that a child be provided with a father as 
well as a mother." 221 The case can be interpreted 
in a number of ways. On the one hand; the court 
claimed to be protecting the parental expectation 
of the donor. 222 On the other hand, the case may 
be expanded to stand for the rigid enforcement of 
traditional values upholding the nuclear family. 
A recent article on the subject of AID stated 
that C.M. v. C.C. 
could also be extended to hold that a known 
sperm donor must be recognized as the fa-
ther of an unmarried woman's child in a 
case where neither party intended the man 
to act as the father or to play any greater 
various state Constitutions. The United States Supreme 
Court has not reached the question. But see Springs v. Car-
son, 470 Pa. 274, 368 A.2d 635 (1977); McGowen v. McGo-
wen, 248 Pa. Super. 41, 374 A.2d 1306 (1977). 
218. For a thorough analysis of First Amendment rights 
within the context of lesbian custody cases, see, Sheppard, 
Lesbian Custody and a Quest for Normative Standards-
Women 's Rts L. Rep. ( ). 
219. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland 
County Ct. 1977). 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 166, 377 A.2d at 824. 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 168-171. 
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role in the child's development than provid-
ing the sperm for its conception. 223 
Furthermore, although the court in C.M. v. C.C. 
mentions that "[i]t is in the child's best interests to 
have two parents whenever possible," 224 the opin-
ion fails to examine the possibility that the home 
created by C.C. may have been better for her 
child than one in which C.M. may intervene. The 
court ignores the problems and antagonism that 
may arise as a result of the donor's intervention 
into an established family unit, and the effect that 
such antagonism could have on the AID child. 225 
In the process, the court also effectively denies 
single mothers the right to the full realization of 
single parenthood through AID. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Recognition of a single wc>man's desire to con-
ceive a child through AID conception as a funda-
mental right guaranteed by the Constitution of 
the United States requires a broader interpreta-
tion of the fundamental rights of procreative pri-
vacy, than has yet been explicitly endorsed by the 
United States Supreme Court. Case law dealing 
with contraception and abortion clearly protects a 
single woman's decision to prevent an unwanted 
pregnancy, and the right to choose which is the 
heart of this case law demands protection of a 
single woman's decision to conceive. The decision 
of a single woman to conceive necessarily involves 
a non-traditional family arrangement, however, 
so protection of this decision additionally requires 
at least passive acceptance of alternative lifestyles. 
The single parent family that results when a single 
woman gives birth as a consequence of sexual 
intercourse is in fact a passively accepted arrange-
ment in American society. However, given the 
unique circumstances of AID conception, the 
question becomes one of whether the state may 
constitutionally prevent this particular type of sin-
gle parenthood. 
The state interests that can be asserted to sup-
port restrictions on a single woman's right to con-
ceive, bear and raise a child through AID concep-
223. Kritchevskv, The Unmarried Woman '.s Right to Arti-
,ficial lnseminatior;: A Call for an Expanded Definition of 
Family, 4 HARV. WoMEN°S L.J. 1, 15 (1981). 
224. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 166-7, 377 A.2d 
821, 824-25 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977). 
225. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CmLD 53, 116-18 (rev. ed. 1979). 
tion (e.g. the prevention of illegitimacy, 
avoidance of potential harm to the child and pro-
tection of the child's best interests) are not any 
more compelling in the AID context than they are 
in the context of other single mothers. Therefore, 
the single AID mother should not be subject to 
any greater suppression of her procreative rights 
than is directed towards other single mothers. 
Limiting access to AID conception on the basis of 
marital status is no more acceptable than attempts 
to prohibit conception through sexual intercourse 
on the basis of marital status. The fact that AID 
conception may be more susceptible to successful 
prohibition does not render the prohibition more 
justified. 
· In determining how much suppression of con-
ception is permissible, it is important to distin-
guish the state's ability to encourage certain de-
sired forms of behavior through legitimate state 
regulation from the state's deprivation of funda-
mental rights. The state may choose to make con-
traception freely available or to subsidize steriliza-
tion procedures, but it cannot force or prohibit an 
individual's use of contraceptives or submission to 
sterilization without such action being subject to 
strict scrutiny. Similarly, the state may treat par-
ents of legitimate children and parents of illegiti-
mate children differently if such treatment is ra-
tionally related to some legitimate state interests, 
but such treatment cannot result in the depriva-
tion of a fundamental right unless it is the least 
restrictive means of serving compelling state inter-
ests. 
Furthermore, due to the availability of alterna-
tive methods of conception, blocking access to 
AID facilities on the basis of marital status does 
not effectively serve any state interest in the pre-
vention of conception of illegitimate children or 
the avoidance of potential harm to such children. 
This lack of access does, however, infringe on the 
single woman's rights of privacy and procreation 
as they relate to her choice of the means of con-
ception most consistent with her personal values. 
Restrictive access thus functions as a deprivation 
of at least some single women's fundamental 
rights while being an impermissibly broad means 
of advancing the compelling state interest in the 
welfare of children. 
The state interests asserted to justify the com-
mon law recognition of a donor's paternity 
rights-Le., the rights of unwed fathers and the 
determination of the best interests of children-
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should not be protected by an automatic finding 
that two parents are always better than one. The 
protection of a single woman's right to be a single 
parent through AID can be consistent with the 
promotion of these asserted state interests because 
1) a donor does not have the same constitutional 
rights as other unwed fathers unless he had paren-
tal expectations at the time of donation; and 2) a 
woman can responsibly and conscientiously 
choose the option of single parenthood without 
necessary detriment to the child. 
A court that is sensitive to a single woman's 
right to be a single parent through AID, to the 
protection of the rights of unwed fathers, and to 
the best interests of the AID child may often de-
cide in favor of single parenthood through AID. 
Such a court would require that a donor who 
wishes to assert a claim of paternal rights in the 
AID child must prove his biological paternity and 
the existence of parental expectations at the time 
of the insemination before his constitutional rights 
as a father would be recognized. The recognized 
constitutional rights of unwed fathers are minimal 
in the absence of a de facto parental relationship 
and are adequately protected when the court's 
decision is made in the best interests of the child. 
In making a determination of the child's best 
interests, the court must weigh in each case the 
potential benefits that would result from the de-
nial of a donor's paternity rights with the benefits 
that would result from the granting of such rights. 
This balancing must include an honest, unbiased 
appraisal of the woman's ability to care for the 
child without the assistance of the donor, and of 
the potentially disruptive impact of the donor's 
intervention into the mother's existing family 
group. This balance essentially weighs the bene-
fits of the home in which the single mother in-
tended to raise her AID child without the donor's 
interference against the benefits of the known do-
nor's subsequent involvement in that home. At the 
very least, the court must be able to appreciate 
the mother's preference as a valid alternative in 
order to adequately protect the mother's individ-
ual constitutional rights as well as the best inter-
ests of her child. 
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